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Assignment
1. My name is Rebecca Tushnet, and I am a lawyer and a law professor. I have been retained
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to serve as a testifying expert in the case it has
brought against 1-800 Contacts, Inc. (Respondent), pending before Administrative Law
Judge Michael Chappell (No. 9372). Specifically, the FTC has asked me to review the
reports submitted by Respondent’s experts Ronald C. Goodstein, Howard S. Hogan, William
Landes, Kevin M. Murphy, and Kent Van Liere from the perspective of trademark and
advertising law and to provide my analyses and opinions in rebuttal to analyses and opinions
that any of them has expressed regarding these two related areas of the law.
2. The FTC is paying me for my time at a discounted rate of $200 per hour. None of my
compensation depends on my conclusions or on the outcome of this case.
Qualifications
3. I am a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center. I have taught trademark,
copyright, and advertising law since 2002, first at NYU and then since 2004 at Georgetown.
I will become the Frank Stanton Professor of First Amendment Law at Harvard in summer
2017. I have a B.A. from Harvard and a J.D. from Yale. My curriculum vitae is attached as
Exhibit A.
4. After my clerkships, I practiced at Debevoise & Plimpton for two years, primarily doing
copyright, trademark, and advertising litigation. I have written extensively on trademark and
advertising law, including articles published in Texas Law Review, University of
Pennsylvania Law Review (cited by the Supreme Court in Lexmark International, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc.,134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)), and Harvard Law Review. With
Eric Goldman of Santa Clara Law, I have written the only casebook dedicated to advertising
and marketing law. I regularly write about advertising and trademark law at my blog,
43(b)log, which has been on the ABA Journal’s Blawg 100 of top law blogs since 2012. I
received Public Knowledge’s IP3 award for significant contributions to the field of
intellectual property law in 2015.
5. I regularly attend conferences about intellectual property law and participate on academic as
well as practitioner-oriented panels. I regularly author amicus briefs on trademark and
advertising-related issues, including in Lee v. Tam, No. 15-1293 (U.S., argued Jan. 18, 2017);
Slep-Tone Entertainment Corp. v. Canton Phoenix Inc., No. 14-36018 (9th Cir., pending);
Tobinick v. Novella, – F.3d –, 2017 WL 603832 (11th Cir. 2017); Louis Vuitton Malletier,
S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc., – Fed. App’x –, 2016 WL 7436489 (2d Cir. 2016); Dryer v.
National Football League, 814 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2016); Phoenix Entertainment Partners v.
Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2016); In re GNC Corp., 789 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2015), Multi
Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2015); Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014); and Christian
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
In my pursuit of greater knowledge and understanding of business practices that implicate
trademark and advertising law, I successfully intervened in FTC v. Amazon, 14-cv-01038
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(W.D. Wash. 2016), to seek more public disclosure regarding Amazon’s practices relating to
in-app purchases, as well as in SanMedica Int’l, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 13-cv-00169
(D. Utah filed publicly Apr. 15, 2015), where I sought and achieved more public disclosure
about the click-through rates for keyword advertising on which the court had based its
decision.
I.

Introduction

6. As a necessary framework for understanding my analyses and opinions in rebuttal to
Respondent’s experts, I describe below some principles that underlie trademarks and
advertising. I note that Mr. Hogan has provided a similar overview as part of his expert
report.1
7. Trademark law is a specialized branch of the law of unfair competition and false advertising
that has developed some unique doctrines of its own. Its genesis in unfair competition,
however, has left it with a legacy of considering the harms of overprotection as well as
underprotection, balancing private interests with public interests in competition and freedom
of speech. Multiple trademark policies, including those allowing “nominative fair use” and
non-trademark uses, reflect this deliberate compromise among varying interests.2 The
freedom to take advantage of markets identified by one’s competitors—even competitors
who created that market—is a core part of the freedom to compete protected by the limits on
trademark law.3 So is the freedom to engage in comparative advertising targeting likely
consumers of a trademark owner’s product or service.4 Importantly, comparative advertising
must be able to reach consumers who might be interested in learning about alternatives even
when they would otherwise go with the option they already know; otherwise it fails to reach
precisely that group of consumers for whom it may be most useful.
8. Disgruntled trademark owners understandably may decry these practices as “free riding,” but
such free riding is the lifeblood of competition.5 Remedies reaching beyond trademark’s
1

Cf. Hogan Report Section III (“Overview of Trademark Law”).
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 119, 122 (2004) (explaining that the
common law, unchanged by the Lanham Act, tolerated some degree of likely confusion in the service of truthful
description).
3
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) (“Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the
goodwill of the article known as ‘Shredded Wheat’; and thus is sharing in a market which was created by the skill
and judgment of plaintiff's predecessor and has been widely extended by vast expenditures in advertising
persistently made. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is
the exercise of a right possessed by all—and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply
interested.”).
4
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003) (noting that Congress, in enacting the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act, included a provision allowing for fair use of a registered trademark in comparative
advertising or promotion to address First Amendment concerns). See also Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comparative
Advertising; Issuance of a Policy Statement, 44 Fed. Reg. 47,328, 47,328 (Aug. 13, 1979) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §
14.15(c)) (expressing a policy of encouraging “comparative advertising which names, or makes reference to,
competitors” in a truthful, nondeceptive manner).
5
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Indeed, it is routine for vendors to
seek specific ‘product placement’ in retail stores precisely to capitalize on their competitors’ name recognition. For
example, a drug store typically places its own store-brand generic products next to the trademarked products they
emulate in order to induce a customer who has specifically sought out the trademarked product to consider the
2
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tailored rights to prohibit all competitive uses, including prohibitions on “keyword bidding”
and “broad matching,” as well as negative keyword requirements on online advertising
platforms, contradict the policies of Congress and the courts. Contrary to the opinions
expressed by Mr. Hogan, Professor Landes, and Professor Murphy in their respective
reports,6 1-800 Contacts’ “bidding” agreements with accused infringers have gone far beyond
what courts have considered acceptable remedies for violations of trademark rights, and also
beyond the scope of consent and default judgments in cases of counterfeiting and standard
trademark infringement (where the defendant uses the plaintiff’s mark to identify itself).
Trademark law does not countenance bans on simple comparative advertising designed to
reach and influence the consumer at a point when she may be open to considering options.
9. Professor Goodstein’s report discusses evidence indicating that some consumers may have
trouble telling why they are seeing a particular search result.7 This is one type of potential
confusion, and search engine labeling of sponsored results merits consideration under false
advertising law and the FTC’s rules about disclosing sponsorship. But, as I understand it,
such considerations are not at issue in this case. Rather, the question is whether confusion
over why a result appears in a search is trademark confusion, and the answer is no. Such
confusion does not cause the harms that are the gravamen of trademark infringement, and it
does not mean that consumers will mistakenly buy from one seller instead of the one they
intended to patronize. Conflating different kinds of confusion obscures the proper role of
trademark law in the larger system of competition law.

store’s less-expensive alternative.”); Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (“Of course
there can be no aftermarket without an original market, and in that sense sellers in a trademarked good’s aftermarket
are free riding on the trademark. But in that attenuated sense of free riding, almost everyone in business is free
riding.”). See also Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 381, 397 (2009) (arguing that
redirection of consumers to competing brands is widely accepted by courts in an offline-retail context); Brett M.
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 268-71 (2007) (discussing positive effects of
spillovers not under the control of intellectual property owners).
6
Hogan Report Section X (“1-800 Contacts’ Settlement Terms with Advertisers Were Supportable and
Commonplace Means to Resolve Trademark Disputes”); Landes Report Section II.F (“Making Trademark
Settlements More Difficult Will Undermine Consumer Benefits from Trademarks”); Murphy Report Section III.B
(“Settlements Can Be an Efficient Way for Companies to Protect Their Trademarks and Limiting the Ability of
Firms to Settle Their Trademark Infringement Claims Can Harm Consumers”).
7
Goodstein Report Section V (“Consumer Confusion Is Reasonably Expected from Sponsored Ads by Other
Retailers That Appear in Response to an Internet Search for ‘1-800 Contacts’”).

3

10. The screenshot below illustrates the crux of the issue:

An example of comparative advertising: the statement “we’ll beat all 1800 and web prices”
in the first sponsored link on right, mapping to www.LensDiscounters.com.8
11. Trademark owners often believe that competitive advertising using their trademarks as
keywords is wrongful, and therefore confusing.9 It is tempting for a business to think that, as
applied to competitors, the term “unfair competition” is redundant. But trademark owners’
subjective impressions of confusion have not been borne out by actual results, either in the
courts or in empirical studies. Contrary to Mr. Hogan’s opinion, no liability for trademark
infringement has ever been found based solely on keyword bidding, as contrasted with cases
involving keyword bidding plus confusing use of a mark in ad text.10 Similarly, his and
Professor Goodstein’s arguments that competitive advertising can cause “dilution” substitute
a marketing conception (in which competition for meaning can cause dilution)11 for the legal

8

1-800F_00045485.xls.
Cf. William E. Gallagher & Ronald C. Goodstein, Inference vs. Speculation in Trademark Infringement Litigation:
Abandoning the Fiction of the Vulcan Mind Meld,, 94 Trademark Rep. 1229, 1267 (2004) (“It is always possible that
a competitor will threaten trademark infringement litigation if it perceives a threat to its market share. Yet, by itself,
this is hardly evidence that the newcomer intended to deceive or confuse consumers and, therefore, not evidence that
supports an inference of likelihood of confusion.”).
10
Hogan Report Section V (“Courts Across the Country Have Held That the Sale and Use of Trademarks as
Keywords Can Give Rise to Actionable Infringement Claims”).
11
E.g., Barbara Loken & Deborah Roedder John, Diluting Brand Beliefs: When Do Brand Extensions Have a
Negative Impact?, 57 J. Marketing 71 (1993) (defining dilution as change in beliefs about brand or in affect
associated with brand).
9
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concept of dilution, which involves use of a famous mark to identify a different product, such
as Kodak pianos or Buick soap.12
II.

Trademark Theory13

12. Conventional explanations of the utility of trademarks appeal to their role in reducing search
costs: compressing information about a product or service into a symbol that consumers can
use for a shortcut to identify what they want, or want to avoid.14 This account is highly
persuasive. However, when it is turned into an argument that “search costs” are themselves
something to be minimized, it mistakes the mechanism for the desired output. There are
different aspects of search, and different kinds of search costs; it is important not to
equivocate about them. Trademark law only concerns itself with certain search costs that
arise out of deceptive uses of a source-identifier.
13. Overprotection of trademarks can therefore be anticompetitive: if one firm could monopolize
the generic term “contacts,” it could prevent consumers from finding out useful information
and increase search costs for consumers interested in alternative suppliers. Even a firm that
invents a new kind of product has the additional burden of creating a generic term for that
product as well as a brand name, in order to allow subsequent competitors to identify what it
is they have to sell without infringing its trademark.15 Likewise, if a firm could prevent
comparative advertising, it could suppress competition, even if it does not assert monopoly
control over a generic term. Truthful, nondeceptive, comparative advertising is widely
recognized as economically beneficial because it enables consumers to use the shorthand
features of trademarks to identify ways in which competitors might be like or different from
the comparator.16
14. Trademarks condense product-related information from a particular supplier, so that the
shopper need not investigate its qualities each time as if it were sold in plain, unmarked
packaging. She can use the trademark as a reference point and quickly choose it or turn
away. However, the entry of a new competitor into the market means that a different kind of
information is now necessary: is the new competitor’s product better or worse than the
familiar set of product attributes, shorthanded by the trademark? A relatively unknown seller
can use some aspects of the shorthand qualities of the trademark to identify itself as a
competitor.17 Indeed, that’s one useful function of comparative advertising. “Jones Soda is
12

Hogan Report Section VI (“Trademark Owners Can Have Viable Dilution Claims in the Keyword Advertising
Context”); Goodstein Report Section VI (“Dilution of 1-800 Contacts’ Trademarks Can Reasonably Be Expected
from Sponsored Ads by Other Retailers That Appear in Response to an Internet Search for ‘1-800 Contacts’”).
13
This section specifically rebuts Professor Hogan’s discussion of trademark law, see Hogan Report ¶¶ 18-50.
14
William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269
(1987) (“In short, a trademark conveys information that allows the consumer to say to himself, ‘I need not
investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me
that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.’”).
15
For example, a FRISBEE flying disc (Reg. No. 0679186).
16
See, e.g., Tahi J. Gnepa, Comparative Advertising In Magazines: Nature, Frequency, and a Test of the
‘Underdog’ Hypothesis, J. ADVERTISING RES. Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 70 (finding that comparative advertising is most
frequently used by “underdog” competitors).
17
Cf. Gallagher & Goodstein, supra, at 1267 (“It is a standard growth strategy for a company to introduce a product
or brand into new markets where it has not been previously offered. A defendant intending to fairly and lawfully
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better than Coke” provides useful information to someone who knows what Coke is even if
she doesn’t know what Jones Soda is, and even if she doesn’t believe or investigate the
claim.
15. The more important point, however, is that market entry and competition adds information to
the retail environment. In that sense, new entrants will increase a consumer’s market-related
“search costs” associated with choosing among substitute products but—if their brand names
are sufficiently distinct—they will not increase the consumer’s product-related search costs
that have been reduced by the shorthand function of the trademark. If the trademark becomes
less capable of commanding consumer attention in an increasingly crowded retail
environment, that is an effect of a larger set of choices, not of interference with the sourceand quality-signaling shorthand function of the trademark. After all, there are no “search
costs” in terms of selecting a producer when the producer has a monopoly.18
16. While the core rationale for trademark protection holds true even when consumers are not
homogeneous in their preferences for information, attention, and other aspects of a product
search, lack of homogeneity complicates matters—some consumers have a preference for
searching, viewing comparison as rewarding in itself.19 Also, consumer preferences and
tastes are often not fixed, and providing consumers information about new alternatives
compete with the plaintiff may market a similar product, target the same market and convey information about its
product that calls attention to similarities with the plaintiff’s product, all with the clear intent to attempt to take
market share away from the plaintiff; that is permissible competition. It is not, by itself, evidence that the newcomer
intended to confuse, and it is certainly not, by itself, evidence that confusion is likely.”).
18
As Mark McKenna has written:
Even when search costs matter to consumers, it is not always the case that reducing search costs best
maximizes consumer welfare. Consumers suffer little in the way of search costs, for example, where they
have few choices; you do not have to search for ticket prices if there is only one airline on which you can
fly. Hence, consumer search costs would be reduced if we eliminated competition. But no one advocates
monopolization of markets on search costs grounds. We generally believe that consumers are better served
by competition, even though competitive markets require more searching than do markets with single
providers. Likewise, trademark law has never prohibited all conflicting uses of a mark regardless of the
contexts in which that mark is used, even though search costs would be minimized in a world with only one
party using APPLE or FORD.
Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67 (2012) (footnote
omitted). Thus, although the existence of competition may lead 1-800 Contacts to decide to run more advertising,
including keyword advertising on its own trademark, 1-800 Contacts has no right to avoid competition—especially
competition spurred by use of a purely generic term (e.g., “contacts” or “contact lens”) that triggers matched ads
when the search term includes 1-800 Contacts’ full mark. The idea that no one at all should be able to advertise
against a consumer’s search that includes 1-800 Contacts’ mark is arbitrary, anticompetitive, and conflicts with
general advertising practices: fashion brands advertise in fashion magazines next to spreads featuring competitors’
clothing; advertisers generally try to target their advertising to fall around stories relevant to their target consumers.
See Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181 Cal. App. 4th 664, 677–78 (1st Dist. 2010) (tobacco company knew that
feature would be about “indie rock” and designed related wraparound ad). 1-800 Contacts would have to pay to
advertise in newspapers that run stories about it, and likewise other competitors could advertise in newspapers that
run stories about 1-800 Contacts, even if that attracts consumers’ attention to competitors. Google’s organic results
are, like newspaper stories about 1-800 Contacts and placement of related ads, matters of the publisher’s editorial
judgment.
19
See, e.g., Gilles Laurent & Jean-Noël Kapferer, Measuring Consumer Involvement Profiles, 22 J. MARKETING
RES. 41 (1985); Sharon E. Beatty & Scott M. Smith, External Search Effort: An Investigation Across Several
Product Categories, 14 J. CONSUM. RES. 83 (1987); Yan Zhang, The Effects of Preference for Information on
Consumers’ Online Health Information Search Behavior, 15 J. MED. INTERNET RES. (2013), doi: 10.2196/jmir.2783.
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therefore can change their behaviors. Contrary to the assumptions implicit in Professor
Goodstein’s report, on the face of it, a consumer who clicks a link for a competitor after
searching for 1-800 Contacts is not obviously confused or distracted; the consumer might
well have extended her search in order to seek more information, or terminated it with a
competitor who offered her better options.
17. The larger insight is that reducing search costs is not an end in itself for trademark law.
Truthful, nondeceptive advertising adds information to the retail environment, which is a
positive; if search costs have to be incurred to learn about market alternatives, they are worth
paying.20 Moreover, to the extent that advertising itself serves as a signal of quality,
comparative advertising—including keyword advertising—can provide a useful signal of
relative quality to consumers.21 As a result, trademark law, including settlement agreements
founded on trademark law, should focus on search costs associated with the shorthand
function of trademark in identifying a specific producer.
18. Relatedly, not all confusion is worth avoiding. Confusion that is immaterial to consumers, or
too trivial, is not worth eliminating, because the measures taken to suppress confusion can be
costly in themselves, and can distort the competitive environment. “Moreover, protecting
consumers from the ‘harm’ of irrelevant confusion can cause them to suffer injury. If courts
undertake to eliminate all confusion, they invite trademark holders to bully competitors and
would-be competitors in an effort to expand their rights under the malleable confusion
doctrines.”22
19. Likewise, not all consumer confusion is trademark confusion.23 It is a fair point that many
consumers do not consciously recognize ads at least some of the time, and cannot articulate
why they are seeing certain results. But that does not mean they are confused about whether
one commercial entity is the source of an ad or affiliated with a competitor whose ad appears
on a results page, just as it is possible to be confused about where you parked your car
without being confused about what model it is. In short, whether or not the consumer
consciously recognizes that a link is a “sponsored” link or an “organic” link says nothing
about whether she can identify the source of that link. Consistent with this distinction, the
20

Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV.
777, 795-98 (2004); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in
Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1232-36 (2007) (explaining that doctrines allowing truthful advertising
and descriptive uses “unambiguously lower search costs”).
21
Stefan Bechtold & Catherine Tucker, Trademarks, Triggers and Online Search, Trademarks, Triggers, and
Online Search, 11 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 718 (2014); cf. Philip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL.
ECON. 729 (1974) (positing that advertising is a seller signal of quality).
22
William P. Kratzke, The Biblical Fool and The Brander: The Law and Economics of Propertization in American
Trademark Law, 34 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 699, 743 (2016); see also Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna,
Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 439-49 (2010) (discussing competitive and speech harms from
extending control over immaterial confusion).
23
See, e.g., Goodstein Report at 19 (“Because many consumers do not recognize the difference between organic
links and sponsored ads, they may inadvertently or mistakenly click on sponsored ads believing those to be the
unbiased, impartial output of the search engine (i.e., organic links) and not the result of an advertiser paying the
search engine for placement ….”). These consumers are confused about why they saw the ad, not about its source;
their confusion about reasons tells us nothing about their opinions, if they have even formed any, about the source of
the ad or, even more importantly, the source of the advertised product.

7

one court that has addressed whether confusion about why search results appear can
constitute trademark infringement has rejected the argument.24
III.

Trademark Doctrine and Evidence from Practice

20. In this section, I respond principally to the opinions expressed in Mr. Hogan’s report about
whether the sale and use of trademarks in keyword advertising constitutes infringement.25 As
I explain below, the courts have uniformly rejected keyword advertising, standing alone, as
an act of trademark infringement.
21. When courts were unfamiliar with the internet, they feared that consumers could easily be
confused by unauthorized uses of trademarks,26 though even then, courts were careful to
preserve options for competition.27 The “developed body of case law,” Hogan Report at para
1, has always tilted in favor of competitive advertising, and it has only continued to move
further in that direction. Courts quickly recognized that there were legally significant
differences between (1) a sign falsely claiming to offer “Blockbuster movies” and a sign
offering movie rentals targeted at people who had expressed an interest in renting at
Blockbuster, as well as (2) the effort of getting off a highway and entering a physical store
and the ease of clicking the “back” button on a browser or opening a new tab. Both of these
distinctions have, from the beginning, structured the case law, leading courts to distinguish
carefully between deceptive and nondeceptive, procompetitive forms of online advertising.
A.

Judicial Treatment of Keyword Advertising Has Consistently Favored
Competitive Advertisers

22. Online, keyword advertising has supplemented the geographic competition that is a familiar
part of the physical world. Stores often situate themselves near close competitors, in order to
offer tempting alternatives to consumers who are in a buying mood. They do this because
that is where the consumers will be, “using” or “free riding” on their competitors’
locations—or, as we know it, creating efficient concentrations of options and driving price
competition.
23. Professor Landes suggests that these practices, like the related practice of locating
generic/house brands of common grocery products next to their name-brand rivals, are not
problematic because “[l]ocating in proximity to a rival or asking a distributor to represent a
rival product does not require the use of a competitor’s trademark to divert customers.”28
Professor Landes’ conclusion involves assumptions about “use” that are not borne out by
commercial practices. The only distinction is that, in an internet search, a consumer enters a
24

Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that labeling search results
made confusion by reasonable consumers unlikely, over a dissent arguing that confusion about why plaintiff’s
products did not appear in search results could be actionable), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1231 (2016).
25
Hogan Report Section V.
26
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999)
27
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns, Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J.,
concurring) (carefully distinguishing between misleadingly labeled and nonmisleadingly labeled ads; those that are
clearly labeled may cause diversion, but not confusion to a reasonable consumer).
28
Landes Report, at 18.
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search term, while in physical shopping, she may head to the clothes store she is used to
patronizing, having that store in mind in the same way she may have a brand in mind when
she begins an online search. If a competitor has located on her path, it can accomplish the
exact same diversion for the exact same reason.29 The competitor has “used” the well-known
brand to figure out where to place itself, but such “use” does not count as “use in commerce”
for purposes of trademark law. And the assumption that offline associations created by
proximity will not confuse is merely that—there is no comparative evidence about how
consumers think about offline associations due to physical proximity.30
i.

The Consensus on Keyword Purchases Has Long Been That They Are Legitimate

24. Where search results are dynamic and responsive to consumer input, targeted advertising
plays the same role as physical proximity: enabling competitors to find consumers where
those consumers are looking. Although most courts generally accepted this principle from
the beginning, as they became more familiar with the operation of the internet, they began to
understand this pro-competitive function even more clearly. The solidifying consensus
matched the scholarly consensus on the lack of confusion (including initial interest
confusion), which developed rapidly alongside the rise of keyword advertising. See, e.g.,
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 779–84 (2004); Daniel C. Glazer & Dev R. Dhamija,
Revisiting Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 952, 953 (2005)
(arguing that initial interest confusion is generally inappropriate in the online context); Eric
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 565
(2005) (arguing that initial interest confusion claims for internet advertising are “predicated
on multiple mistaken and empirically unsupported assumptions about searcher behavior”);
David M. Klein & Daniel C. Glazer, Reconsidering Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet,
93 TRADEMARK REP. 1035, 1035 (2003) (similar); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest
Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005).
Mr. Hogan’s report cites student notes and a few other sources indicating, over a decade ago,
that questions about keywords were unsettled, Hogan Report at 81 n.291, but even those less
expert sources were largely discussing use of ad text, not pure keyword buys.31

29

See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929); Deven Desai, Why Do Competitors Set Up
Shop Near Each Other?, Dec. 21, 2009, http://madisonian.net/2009/12/21/why-do-competitors-set-up-shop-neareach-other/ (“Some of the arguments for setting up shop near competitors smack of freeriding. … The shopkeepers
are all engaged in the behavior, know it, and use it to their mutual advantage while still driving prices down.”); Ken
Steif, Why Do Certain Retail Stores Cluster Together?, October 24, 2013, https://www.planetizen.com/node/65765
(“Businesses put a great deal of thought into where they choose to locate. They consider the local customer base,
transportation options, and yes, the locations of their competitors. Many of these firms are making a very conscious
decision to locate near their competitors.”).
30
In certain cases, proximity plus deceptive naming can lead to confusion, but it is the deceptive naming that is the
key. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Problem Pregnancy of Worcester, Inc., 498 N.E.2d 1044 (Mass.
1986) (finding infringement liability where similarly named clinic opened on the same floor as Planned Parenthood).
31
Similarly, Professor Goodstein’s working definition of initial interest confusion relies on a decision in which the
defendants used the plaintiffs’ trademarks on their websites. Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239
(10th Cir. 2006) (distinguished by 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.Com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1245 (10th Cir. 2013)).
Goodstein Report at 17 n.84.
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25. In Rescuecom Corp. v. Computer Troubleshooters USA, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1267
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 16, 2006), for example, the court refused to decide the issue of “use in
commerce” on a motion to dismiss because it was a novel legal issue. Infringement was not
the basis of the motion, and so the court did not address whether keyword purchases alone
could be confusing. Defendants generally failed to convince courts that keyword purchases
were not “use in commerce,” meaning that there was federal jurisdiction over keyword
lawsuits. Nonetheless, the cases refused to find liability based solely on keyword purchases.
It is not very surprising that the cases Mr. Hogan identifies in his Report were almost entirely
based on keyword purchases plus use of plaintiff’s mark in ad text, given the skepticism
among courts and lawyers that keyword advertising alone could be the foundation of
liability; very few keyword-only cases were ever brought, even at the beginning.
26. Leading cases hold that avoiding confusing use of a trademark in ad text is all that is
necessary. Reasonable consumers can and do use labeling to distinguish different sources.32
To avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff has to show that a jury could find the ad text itself
likely to confuse, and may not rely on the keyword purchase.33
27. A typical case points out how extreme a pure keyword-based liability claim, as espoused by
Respondent’s experts, is:
BPI points to no case indicating that the simple purchase of advertising keywords,
without more, may constitute initial interest confusion. As noted, “[i]nitial interest
confusion . . . occurs when a customer is lured to a product by the similarity of the
mark . . . .” Thus, the “luring” becomes the critical element. In situations such as
the one presented here, the use of a keyword encompassing a competitor’s terms
does not necessarily produce an infringing advertisement; it is the content of the
advertisement and/or the manner in which the mark is used that creates initial
interest confusion.
BPI’s premise logically culminates in the destruction of common Internet
advertising methods and unreasonably encumbers generally accepted competitive
practices.34
28. Furthermore, some courts have explicitly recognized keyword advertising as a form of
nominative fair use, which allows use of another’s trademark in order to communicate about

32

Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2015); Network Automation, Inc. v.
Advanced System Concepts, Inc., 638 F. 3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011). In Lens.Com, the Tenth Circuit observed:
“Perhaps in the abstract, one who searches for a particular business with a strong mark and sees an entry on the
results page will naturally infer that the entry is for that business. But that inference is an unnatural one when the
entry is clearly labeled as an advertisement and clearly identifies the source, which has a name quite different from
the business being searched for.” 722 F.3d at 1245.
33
See Edible Arrangements, LLC v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 2016 WL 4074121 (D. Conn. July 29, 2016)
(plaintiff’s claims go to jury on whether “edible fruit arrangements” in ad heading, without sufficient disclosure of
true source, was likely to confuse).
34
USA Nutraceuticals Group, Inc. v. BPI Sports, LLC, 2016 WL 695596 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2016).
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that trademark owner.35 Whether or not they use that terminology, however, courts have
been clear about the legality of keyword advertising for a number of years. Examples
include:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced System Concepts, Inc., 638 F. 3d 1137 (9th Cir.
2011) (finding no likelihood of confusion, noting importance of labeling and appearance
of advertisements and the surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page);
Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120871, at *150 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2015) (finding consensus approval of keyword
advertising);
Ison v. Google, Inc., 2015 WL 3395574 (Cal. Ct. App. May 27, 2015) (rejecting lawsuit
against Google for keyword sales);
Lasoff v. Amazon.com, 2017 WL 372948 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 2017) (rejecting lawsuit
against Amazon for its keyword purchases);
ZW USA, Inc. v. PWD Systems, LLC, 2016 WL 5236934 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2016)
(keyword advertising evidences competition, not confusion);
Concordia Partners, LLC v. Pick, No. 14-cv-009 (D. Me. July 2, 2015) (finding that any
confusion resulted from parties’ prior relationship, not from keyword ads);
Alzheimer’s Foundation of America v. Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders
Assoc., 10 Civ. 3314 (RWS), slip op. at 13-39 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015) (denying a
preliminary injunction to block the purchase of search engine ads ties to trademarked
keywords);
Infogroup, Inc. v. DatabaseLLC, 2015 WL 1499066 (D. Neb. Mar. 30, 2015) (finding
confusion unlikely from keyword purchase);
M-Edge Accessories LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 2015 WL 403164, at *12 (D. Md. Jan.
29, 2015) (granting summary judgment on keyword related claims);
EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue Corp., 2014 WL 4702200 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 2014) (same);
Infostream Group Inc. v. Avid Life Media Inc., No. CV 12-09315 DDP, 2013 WL
6018030 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2013) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff's
trademark infringement claim);
Allied Interstate LLC v. Kimmel & Silverman P.C., 2013 WL 4245987 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
12, 2013) (granting judgment on the pleadings despite both keyword use and use in ad
copy because defendant made referential use);
General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Chumley, No. 10-cv-01398-PABKLM, 2013 WL
1900562 (D. Colo. May 7, 2013) (finding no likelihood of confusion for keyword
purchase and use of plaintiff’s mark in ad copy);
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 10-3542, 2012 WL 5269213 (E.D. Pa.,
Oct. 25, 2012) (finding no likelihood of confusion from keyword buys given separation
and labeling of ads), aff’d, 597 Fed. App’x 116, 130 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2015);
Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. James Hardie Building Prods., Inc., 2012 WL 5520394, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162980 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss on
tortious interference claims from keyword buys);

35

International Payment Services, LLC v. CardPaymentOptions.com, 2:14-cv-02604-CBM-JC (C.D. Cal. June 5,
2015); Allied Interstate LLC v. Kimmel & Silverman P.C., 2013 WL 4245987 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) (finding
referential use and citing the fair use exclusion in the antidilution statute).
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x
x
x

ii.

Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (dismissing keyword
infringement claim on the pleadings); 2012 WL 5011007 (E.D. Cal. October 17, 2012)
(granting summary judgment on amended complaint);
Heartbrand Beef, Inc. v. Lobel’s of New York, LLC, 2009 WL 311087 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5,
2009) (granting motion to dismiss false designation of origin claims based on keyword
purchases); and
J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P’ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 WL
30115 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 4, 2007) (granting motion to dismiss infringement claims based on
keyword purchases).
Using the Plaintiff’s Mark in Ad Text Is the Key Fact in Keyword Cases

29. While the case law does take differing facts into account, those facts turn on whether the
defendant’s ads display the plaintiff’s mark to consumers as the title of the ad, or are instead
otherwise labeled. Indeed, Mr. Hogan demonstrates that courts commonly find triable issues
of fact when sponsored ads actually use the plaintiff’s mark in the text of advertising, in
contrast to the advertisements at issue here. This result further supports the conclusion that
keyword advertising on its own is unobjectionable. The following cases featured triable
issues based on ads using the claimed mark in text, not just keyword buys:
x

x
x

Edible Arrangements, LLC v. Provide Commerce, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-00250 (VLB), 2016
WL 4074121, at *11 (D. Conn. July 29, 2016), Hogan Report at 67, para. 108 (whether
the defendant’s ad titled “Edible Fruit Arrangements” was a confusing display of the
mark “Edible Arrangements”);
Gravity Defyer Corp. v. Under Armour, Inc., No. LA CV13-01842, 2014 WL 3766724,
at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2014), Hogan Report at 67, para. 108 (whether ads labeled
“Under Armour Micro G Defy” would be confused with ads labeled “G Defy”); and
Soaring Helmet Corp. v. Nanal, Inc., No. C09-0789JLR, 2011 WL 39058 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 3, 2011), Hogan Report at 67, para. 108 (whether ads labeled “50% off Vega
Helmets” for a retailer that did not sell Vega Helmets would cause confusion with
plaintiff’s Vega Helmets mark):

30. In addition, in Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc. v. Eastern Shore Toyota LLC, No. 3:09cv571,
2010 WL 3781552, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2010), Hogan Report, at 67, para. 108, the
challenged ads incorporated the plaintiff’s marks in the domain names (which were displayed
12

as part of the ads). The court subsequently granted judgment as a matter of law on the
keyword-based claims after the close of evidence, while allowing cybersquatting claims to
proceed. See Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc. v. Eastern Shore Toyota LLC, No. 3:09cv571,
2010 WL 4809355 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2010).
31. These cases recognize that trademark law does not entitle trademark owners to “own”
consumers just because those consumers thought about the trademark owner first in
beginning their search. Even initial interest confusion requires more than a showing that the
plaintiff’s trademark was a but-for cause of the defendant’s ad catching a consumer’s eye.
32. In sum, the cases cited by Mr. Hogan as examples of keyword advertising giving rise to
trademark infringement liability can be readily distinguished by the fact that use of the
plaintiff’s trademark in advertising text, not in keyword searches, is the proper context in
which consumer confusion may arise.
iii.

Alleged Counterexamples Reveal the Weakness of a Keyword-Alone Claim

33. The case law does not support Mr. Hogan’s position that courts routinely deny 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss keyword-advertising-only claims. Cited by Mr. Hogan’s report at 65,
Hearts on Fire Co., LLC v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D. Mass. 2009), did deny a
motion to dismiss in a case of pure keyword advertising without further display of the
plaintiff’s mark. Still, the court in that case expressed understandable skepticism that any
proof of confusion would ultimately develop, despite its conclusion that the plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged likely confusion given the unusual fact that the parties were not direct
competitors. Its reasoning is worth quoting at length to show the barriers to any keywordbased claim:
Initial interest confusion, for example, has been invoked in circumstances where
one company “piggybacks” on its competitor’s trademark, rewarding his search
for one particular product with a choice among several similar items.
Infringement is not nearly so obvious from this vantage point. Rather than a
misleading billboard, this analogy is more akin to a menu—one that offers a
variety of distinct products, all keyed to the consumer’s initial search. … Where
the distinction between these vendors is clear, she now has a simple choice
between products, each of which is as easily accessible as the next. If the
consumer ultimately selects a competitor’s product, she has been diverted to
a more attractive offer but she has not been confused or misled. While she
may have gotten to the search-results list via the trademarked name, once
there, the advertised products are easily distinguished.
In much the same way, keyword purchasing may, in many cases, be
analogized to a drug store that “typically places its own store-brand generic
products next to the trademarked products they emulate in order to induce a
customer who has specifically sought out the trademarked product to
consider the store’s less-expensive alternative.” The generic product capitalizes
on the recognizable brand name but the consumer benefits by being offered a
13

lower-cost product. At no point is the consumer confused about the alternatives
presented to her. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L.Rev. 777, 785 (2004)
(arguing that the primary purpose of the Lanham Act is to reduce consumer
search costs). The goodwill invested in the protected mark remains undisturbed
while the consumer reaps the benefit of competing goods.36 Trademark
infringement would seem to be unsupportable in this scenario. Mere diversion,
without any hint of confusion, is not enough.
…. Many cases, including this one, will fall somewhere between the incarnations
of so-called initial interest confusion discussed above—the misleading billboard
or the choice-enhancing menu. The Court’s task is to distinguish between them.
As a preliminary matter, the Court agrees with the many scholars who find the
deceptive billboard analogy often inapt in the internet context. See, e.g., Jonathan
Moskin, Virtual Trademark Use: The Parallel World of Keyword Ads, 98
Trademark Rep. 873, 896 (2008); Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and
the Demise of “Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 371, 427–29 (2006).
Unlike the deceived shopper who is unlikely to get back on the highway, the
internet consumer can easily click the ‘back’ button on her web browser and
return almost instantly to the search results list to find the sought-after
brand. Her added search costs, in other words, may often be very low while
her comparative choice among products is greatly expanded.
The ease with which an internet shopper can reverse course counsels against overexpansive trademark protection, as any confusion may be extremely temporary
and quickly remedied. …The choice-enhancing properties of internet advertising
should not be stifled on account of fleeting confusion among competing products.
Trademark protections must ultimately accrue to the consumer’s benefit. See
Dogan & Lemley, supra, at 778–789 (citing S.Rep. No. 79–1333, at 1–17; E.I. Du
pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102, 37 S.Ct. 575, 61
L.Ed. 1016 (1917)).
… As with any alleged trademark violation, plaintiffs must show a genuine and
“substantial” likelihood of confusion. See Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. AASTAR
Mortgage Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1996) (requiring evidence of a substantial
36

Court’s footnote 10:
The Plaintiff argues that the use of its trademark to divert internet traffic capitalizes on the trademark’s
goodwill. Certainly, protecting a trademark’s goodwill is one of the twin goals of the Lanham Act. The
Lanham Act “encourage[s] the production of quality products,” and simultaneously discourages those who
hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer’s inability to quickly evaluate the quality of an
item offered for sale. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64, 115 S. Ct. 1300, 131
L.Ed.2d 248 (1995) (quoting 1 McCarthy, § 2.01[2] ). The crux of this second goal, however, is not simply
to protect companies, but to do so in furtherance of consumer interests. Unlike patents and copyrights,
trademarks are not property rights in gross, but rather “limited entitlements to protect against uses that
diminish the informative value of marks.” Dogan & Lemley, supra, at 778–789 (citing S.Rep. No. 79–1333,
at 1–17; E.I. Du pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102, 37 S. Ct. 575, 61 L.Ed. 1016
(1917)). Their use alone does not result in a violation.
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likelihood of confusion); Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman
Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that evidence showing a
few instances of temporary confusion was insufficient to support trademark
infringement). The alleged confusion must be truly costly to the consumer.
This principle was implicit in the bricks-and-mortar cases that laid the
groundwork for initial interest confusion as well as the Ninth Circuit’s billboard
analogy, which assumed that the deceived shopper, once diverted, would not get
back on the highway. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d
254 (2d Cir. 1987) (competitor’s logo confused oil traders into investing a
considerable amount of time and effort into pre-sale negotiations with the
defendant); Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1341–42 (similar mark would entice even
sophisticated consumers to consider defendant’s pianos, even if any confusion
was resolved prior to any purchase). …
Hearts on Fire is a diamond wholesaler, while Blue Nile is an internet diamond
retailer; the two companies are not plain or obvious competitors. … Moreover, if
the consumer clicked on the sponsored link thinking that he would find the
sought-after diamonds at Blue Nile’s website, Plaintiff alleges that on arrival
nothing there would immediately alert him to his mistake. Whether this likely
confusion was sufficiently sustained on all the facts for Plaintiff to prevail on its
infringement claim is a question for summary judgment. For now, the Plaintiff has
alleged enough.37
34. As the Blue Nile case indicates, courts have recognized the ease of clicking “back” in case a
consumer is dissatisfied with any given website, making harm far less likely than if the
consumer had taken serious steps toward the transaction, such as traveling to a particular
store or engaging in preliminary negotiations. The doctrine of initial interest confusion
makes sense when consumers have large sunk costs in search, but risks threatening
competition when the result of a practice is that some consumers end up not confused, but
instead diverted because a competitor’s offer seems better. While there may be no good
reason to risk likely confusion in the classic initial interest confusion case in which the
defendant is using a highly similar mark as its own trademark, the fact that comparative
advertising might catch a consumer’s eye has pro-competitive benefits that weigh against
suppressing advertising based on that risk.
35. There are only a handful of arguably similar cases involving keywords alone. Mr. Hogan
cites FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. Les Parfums, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2009),
which is a keyword-only case, but it does not support his position because the defendant did
not move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that keyword advertising itself was not
actionable. The defendant instead moved to dismiss by arguing that the plaintiff’s marks
were not protectable. As a result, the court did not rule on the plausibility of the plaintiff’s
confusion theory.

37

Id. at 285-89 (emphases added).
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36. Mr. Hogan also suggests that Lbf Travel, Inc. v. Fareportal, Inc., No. 13 Civ.
9143(LAK)(GWG), 2014 WL 5671853, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2014), is an example where
keyword advertising alone, without use in ad text, was potentially infringing. Hogan Report
at 65, para. 107. However, the document to which Mr. Hogan cites was the never-adopted
report and recommendation of a magistrate judge.38 The district judge adopted the
recommendation only to the extent of dismissing other claims, and did not rule on the
keyword infringement claims.39 The plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint,
then dismissed the case with prejudice.40
37. Additionally, Mr. Hogan states that,
In 2006, the Tenth Circuit held that when an advertiser paid a search engine to list the
advertiser “in a preferred position whenever a computer user searched for Plaintiffs’
trademarks,” it was an “attempt[] to divert traffic to Defendants’ web sites” that “used the
goodwill associated with Plaintiffs’ trademarks in such a way that consumers might be
lured to the” products of the trademark owner’s “competitors” in a way that constituted a
“violation of the Lanham Act.”41
38. Mr. Hogan’s description omits several key features of the case that the court of appeals
emphasized in the language immediately preceding and following the quoted language,
including the unauthorized distributors’ use of the plaintiffs’ marks on their own websites
and their use of the marks to sell products other than those of the plaintiffs, despite
advertising that they could supply plaintiffs’ products.42 The court of appeals found that
there was a genuine issue of material fact on confusion based on all those factors. As the
38

Lbf also misread Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009), as suggesting that keyword
purchases alone could be confusing, when the court of appeals was clear that it was the advertising as a whole,
including confusing uses of the plaintiff’s mark in ad text (see “Recusecom” sponsored link in middle of right
column):

39

Order, Lbf Travel, Inc. v. Fareportal, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 9143(LAK)(GWG) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 5, 2015), ECF No.
30.
40
Stipulation of Discontinuance with Prejudice, Lbf Travel, Inc. v. Fareportal, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 9143(LAK)(GWG)
(S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 3, 2015), ECF No. 34.
41
Hogan Report para. 101 (citing Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006)).
42
See Australian Gold, 436 F.3d at 1239 (“Defendants used Plaintiffs’ trademarks on Defendants’ Web sites. …
Defendants continued to use the trademarks to divert internet traffic to their Web sites even when they were not
selling Products.”).
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same court subsequently explained in a case involving 1-800 Contacts, the defendants’ use of
the plaintiffs’ mark on their own websites was a crucial factor in liability in the earlier case,
making cases in which there was no display of the plaintiff’s mark “readily
distinguishable.”43
39. In fact, nearly all of the examples offered in the Hogan Report stem from confusing use of
the plaintiff’s trademark in the text, usually the bold title text, of the ad:
x

Binder v. Disability Group, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2011), also involved
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark, Binder & Binder, as the ad title:

x

Zerorez Franchising System, Inc. v. Distinctive Cleaning, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1032 (D.
Minn. 2015) (confusingly similar ad text touting the defendant as “Zero Rez Carpet
Cleaning,” which was infringing whether displayed in response to a search for plaintiff’s
mark “Zerorez” or for “twin cities carpet cleaning,” and related phrases);44
FenF, LLC v. Smarthingz, Inc., No. 12-cv-14770, 2014 WL 1304779, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 28, 2014) (unopposed summary judgment ruling involving defendant’s use of
FenF’s YogaToes mark to identify its own products),45 vacated on other grounds, 601
Fed. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2015); and
Storus Corp. v. Aroa Marketing, Inc., No. C-06-2454, 2008 WL 449835 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
15, 2008) (plaintiff’s mark in defendant’s ad was underlined and set forth in a larger font
than that used in the rest of the text in the ad).46

x

x

40. Similarly, Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Industrial Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz.
2008), a case whose reasoning was superseded by the Ninth Circuit’s 2011 Network
Automation decision,47 also involved the use of plaintiff’s mark in its entirety to identify
defendant’s product on defendant’s website. Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., No. CV02-1815-PHX-JAT, 2007 WL 1302745 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2007), did not address infringement
and actually led the court to refuse to enjoin broad matching or require negative keyword
matching.48 (I will discuss additional examples, not involving fully litigated cases, in the
43

1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.Com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1245 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding Australian Gold “readily
distinguishable” on this ground).
44
103 F. Supp. 3d at 1038.
45
See FenF, 2014 WL 1304779, at *2 (citing exhibit showing that YogaToes was the title of defendants’ own
website displayed by internet browsers).
46
See Storus, 2008 WL 449835, at *4.
47
Even before the Network Automation decision, Soilworks represented an extreme departure from the trademark
case law, since it held that actionable confusion didn’t require consumers to be confused at any point, even initially.
See 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1131 (holding that liability attached for “diversion” of “attention” with “no deception”).
48
Rhino Sports, 2007 WL 1302745, at *4 (“The basic issue is whether Rhino Sports violated the permanent
injunction beyond substantial compliance when Rhino Sports broad matched keywords using Google’s AdWords
program that led to its sponsored link appearing when the term ‘Sport Court’ (without quotations marks) was
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section where I rebut Mr. Hogan’s opinions regarding whether the bidding agreements were
an appropriate remedy under trademark law.)
41. When Professor Murphy, in discussing 1-800 Contacts’ case against Lens.com for its
keyword advertising, says that “Lens.com prevailed on some, but not all, aspects of 1-800’s
claims,” Murphy Report para. 31, he is not accurately describing the result. Importantly, the
court of appeals affirmed the district court’s finding that keyword advertising was not itself
infringing; the remaining issues involved the use of 1-800 Contacts’ marks in ad text by
some Lens.com affiliates, not keyword advertising,49 and this claim was later dismissed with
prejudice.50 Contrary to Mr. Hogan’s suggestion, 1-800 Contacts’ litigation itself has been
part of the move in which ever more courts have joined the consensus of legal scholars on
internet advertising, which has concluded, for more than a decade, that keyword advertising
alone is not infringement as a matter of trademark law.
42. Even cases cited by Mr. Hogan, in which courts allowed a plaintiff’s case to proceed, did not
ultimately result in a liability finding. This is particularly notable in the Rosetta Stone case
against Google, where at least some of the individual advertisers’ conduct involved
counterfeiting, and thus there would ordinarily be no question as to primary liability.51 Mr.
Hogan’s argument that Rosetta Stone suggests general liability for trademark-related
keyword sales, without reference to the text of ads, Hogan Report para. 129, is particularly
perplexing given his earlier acknowledgement that counterfeit sellers were a significant issue
in that case, Hogan Report para. 113. Counterfeiters promised “Rosetta Stone” products in
their ad text, and the court of appeals specifically noted that Google’s own lawyers could not
tell whether such ads came from authorized sellers without further investigation. (It is my
understanding that 1-800 Contacts is not claiming that its settlement agreements resolved
problems of counterfeit 1-800 Contacts products.) The Rosetta Stone court of appeals also
queried. At issue is not whether Rhino Sports’ current activities infringe Sport Court’s trademark, but whether Rhino
Sports substantially violated the permanent injunction.); id. at *5 (“With regard to keyword purchasing, the
permanent injunction serves as no bar to Rhino Sports’ use of any generic terms such as ‘courts’ or ‘basketball
court.’ Sport Court cites no legal authority establishing that a consumer’s use of certain search terms in a Google or
other web search, that generates a sponsored ad link which reflects no use of the mark at issue in terms of keyword
use, metatag use or ad text use, constitutes use of a mark under the Lanham Act. Indeed, the case law cited by Sport
Court involves some actual use of the mark at issue, either as a keyword, in a metatag, or in the ad text itself—
something that has not been established here.”) (footnote omitted); cf. id. at *8 (“Rhino Sports argues that because
no court has found trademark infringement liability for use of AdWords, there has been a significant change in the
law. However, if no court has indeed found liability, how can this evidence a significant change in the law when this
was the exact state of the law at the time the permanent injunction was handed down?”).
49
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1252 (10th Cir. 2013).
50
Order of Dismissal with Prejduice, 1-800 Contacts v. Lens.com Inc., 2:07-cv-00591-CW (D. Utah filed Nov. 3,
2014), ECF No. 336.
51
676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012). See also Eric Goldman, Yet Another Ruling That Competitive Keyword Ad
Lawsuits Are Stupid--Louisiana Pacific v. James Hardie, Nov. 27, 2012,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/11/27/yet-another-ruling-that-competitive-keyword-ad-lawsuitsare-stupid-louisiana-pacific-v-james-hardie/#4b60dc2e55a3 (“The Rosetta Stone case’s unenlightening denouement
simply supplemented the overwhelming evidence that most keyword advertising lawsuits are stupid—and that fact
hasn’t changed one bit in the past decade. … [C]lients might as well flush wads of cash down the toilet. The
dumbest keyword advertising lawsuits assume that trademark owners ‘own’ potential customers who conduct
keyword searches using their trademarks. … Treating these searchers as the trademark owner’s property is in no
one’s interest—except, of course, the trademark owner hoping to avoid competition.”).
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emphasized the existence of internal Google studies about the potentially confusing effect of
using the trademark in the title or body of an ad.52
iv.

Conclusion: Keyword Advertising Is Robustly Protected by Current Law

43. In summary, the conclusions expressed by Mr. Hogan mischaracterize the state of trademark
law with respect to keyword advertising. Eric Goldman at Santa Clara Law is a preeminent
expert on internet advertising law. Although keyword cases occasionally survive defense
summary judgment motions, Professor Goldman has been unable to identify any case in
which a defendant lost a trial on likely confusion based on purchases of a plaintiff’s
trademark as a search engine keyword—despite the filing of over a hundred such cases.53 As
he and co-author Angel Reyes III explained,
[W]e have good reasons to believe that consumers do not experience any
confusion about the relationship between advertisers and trademark owners when
search results page displays advertisements triggered by a competitor’s trademark.
First, we know of three competitive keyword advertising cases that have reached
a jury trial. The defense won each of those cases. In other words, three different
panels of ordinary consumers, from three different parts of the country, have said
that competitive keyword advertising did not confuse them. While jury results
may not be as statistically rigorous as a well-conducted consumer survey, they
still provide highly persuasive evidence of how reasonable consumers see the
issue.54
44. In 2013, Professor Goldman noted that such lawsuits make no business sense, considering
the poor odds of success.55 Whether the opinions rejecting keyword-based claims are “brief
and breezy defense wins” or “thorough and comprehensive,” the results are the same: the
52
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trademark owner loses.56 Based on the extensive evidence from litigated cases, I share his
opinion: keyword lawsuits are occasionally brought, but absent confusing use of the
plaintiff’s mark in the ad text, they find no traction under trademark law and, thus, when the
defendant contests liability, prove to be unsuccessful.
B.

Truthful Comparative Advertising Is Not Blocked by Other Doctrines

45. The opinions expressed by Mr. Hogan’s report also identify other doctrines purportedly
relevant to keyword advertising, but he does not explain how nonmisleading, noninfringing
uses could violate these other laws.57 State laws and the Lanham Act in §43(a)(1)(B) bar
false and misleading advertising; they also offer protection against conduct deemed to be
“unfair competition” and, where not preempted, states can bar “misappropriation.” However,
when it comes to use of a competitor’s trademarks, the law has deliberately refused to afford
greater protection to trademark owners or additional support for trademark-like claims than
that which would be available from standard trademark law.58 That is to say, claims that one
party’s unconsented use of another party’s trademark constitutes “unfair” competition or
“misappropriation” do not state a claim unless the conduct is infringing, or unless a related
56

Eric Goldman, Confusion From Competitive Keyword Advertising? Fuhgeddaboudit, July 8, 2015,
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(discussing Alzheimer’s Foundation of America, Inc. v. Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Ass’n, Inc.,
2015 WL 4033019 (SDNY June 29, 2015).
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D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) (courts “use the same test to decide whether there has been trademark
infringement, unfair competition, or false designation of origin: the likelihood of confusion between the two
marks.”); PrevMED, Inc. v. MNM–1997, Inc., 2017 WL 785656, No. H–15–2856 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2107)
(“Unfair competition is almost universally regarded as a question of whether the defendant is passing off his goods
or services as those of the plaintiff by virtue of substantial similarity between the two, leading to confusion on the
part of potential customers. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1974).”);
LG Corporation v. Huang, 2017 WL 476539, at *6 n.3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017) (“Trademark infringement and
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Int’l, 2017 WL 432466, *9 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 1, 2017) (the standard is the same under Alabama law); Fed. Express
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factual claim—e.g., “our prices are lower than 1-800 Contacts’”—is untrue.59 Nonfactual or
truthful claims are not unfair. The pro-competition balance set by trademark law cannot be
evaded by relabeling failed trademark claims as “unfair competition” or other state-law
claims.60
C.

Empirical Evidence Supports the Judicial Embrace of Keyword Ads
and Undermines Respondent’s Experts’ Conclusions Regarding
Likelihood of Confusion

46. Contrary to Professor Goodstein’s and Mr. Hogan’s assertions, these legal trends are
consistent with the empirical evidence, which does not indicate a high risk of confusion from
ads that do not use or mimic the trademark owner’s mark in their main text. To begin with,
consumers routinely use the internet to comparison shop, and are well aware of different
tools, including search engines, that allow them to compare their options. As one large
survey reported:
In general, 79% of respondents said that they consider themselves to be bargain
shoppers.
Another 79% said they actively try to find the lowest prices for items when
shopping. And 78% said that they like to compare prices from different stores or
sources before making purchases.
More specifically, 17% said that they always compare prices from one or more
stores or businesses before completing purchases. 41% said they compare prices
most of the time before purchasing. 28% do so about half the time. 10% rarely
ever compare prices before purchasing. And just 4% said they never do.
…15% of respondents said that they’ve used multiple different price comparison
sites or apps when making purchases. And another 14% said they’ve used one
such tool. Amazon, Google, Walmart and eBay were the most popular websites
used for consumers who like to compare prices.61
47. This survey demonstrates that Internet users turn to search engines to seek comparative
information about competing companies. Professor Goodstein’s report suggests that a trier
of fact may infer, merely from a consumer’s brand-name query, that her search has only one
“right” answer, and the appearance of a competitor’s advertisement can reasonably be
expected to confuse that consumer. But as the empirical evidence makes clear, consumers
are not monolithic in their search goals or in their intent when using branded search terms.
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48. Stefan Bechtold and Catherine Tucker took advantage of Google’s 2010 change in its
keyword policy on the European Continent, allowing businesses there to bid on competitors’
trademarks, to test the effect of this change.62 They used a number of different measures,
such as length of query and searcher’s repeated returns to the search engine to refine a query,
to distinguish between navigational and non-navigational searches:63

49. Using this method, Bechtold and Tucker found that (1) Google’s policy change had smaller
effects on searcher behavior with respect to strong trademarks than to weaker ones, but (2)
the 20% of searches that were classified as navigational based on search content became
9.2% less likely to lead a searcher to visit the trademark owner’s website, while the 80% of
searches that were non-navigational became 14.7% more likely to do so. As they point out,
the meaning of navigational and non-navigational searches, and consumers’ likely intent in
using those searches, varies substantially at different stages of the search process:
Empirical research shows that Internet searches often begin with very general
ideas of what product they are looking for. As the multi-stage search process
continues, the search queries become increasingly specific and detailed. In the
various stages of the ‘buying funnel,’ which ranges from attracting awareness of
the consumer through her research and decision-making up to her actual product
purchase, a consumer may use trademarks in Internet searches in very different
ways. In early stages, an Internet search for a particular brand does not necessarily
mean that the consumer is only or even at all interested in products sold under this
brand. The great variety with which consumers are using trademarks in their
search behavior indicates that a legal analysis which focuses on consumer
confusion may not capture all dimensions of trademark use in search engines.64
50. In particular, short “navigational” searches occurring early in the decision-making process
indicate that consumers may be open to alternatives, while more specific searches for a
particular product or feature can indicate a focused intent (whether or not that intent relates to
a purchase, as the “blackberry” example in Bechtold & Tucker’s Table 3 indicates). This
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finding calls into question Professor Goodstein’s assumption that “[a]n Internet search for ‘1800 Contacts’ is typically a ‘navigational’ search, meaning the intent of the user is to
navigate directly to 1-800 Contacts’ website.”65 Bechtold & Tucker continue:
[W]hile the chances that a navigational searcher visits the trademark owner’s
website have decreased after the policy change, she is—compared to her behavior
before the policy change—also consulting search engines less often after having
visited the trademark owner’s website. One speculative interpretation of this
finding would be that the level of confidence navigational searchers have in
visiting the trademark owner’s website could have increased after the policy
change. After the change, a navigational searcher may be first distracted by more
diverse information, including third-party keyword ads. Once she has filtered this
information, however, she may be more confident that the trademark owner’s
website is actually the website she has been looking for.66
51. One lesson from these results is that search is not unidimensional. A longer or more
convoluted search—what looks at first like “increased search costs”—may in fact be a search
that better matches the searcher’s parameters, increasing her welfare.
52. Empirical research that actually asked consumers what they were doing when they entered a
brand name found substantial variety in their answers—even for searches that an outside
observer like Professor Goodstein might well define as “navigational” or “transactional.” As
Professors David Franklyn and David Hyman explain,
We began by asking survey respondents who had searched for a particular brand
of product whether they were usually interested in finding information about that
brand, or whether they were also interested in getting information about similar
products from other brands. A near majority, 47%, of survey respondents
indicated they usually wanted information about the specific brand they had
searched for, while 31% usually wanted information about similar products from
other brands, and 22% had no preference.67
53. Furthermore, when Professors Franklyn and Hyman asked consumers about how they
thought about searching for brands in general, although 65% indicated they wanted
information just about the searched-for brand, less than half indicated that they expected to
get only such information.68 Specifically, 49% of survey respondents expected that they
would see competing products (either along with or entirely substituting for brand-specific
results) for any given search, even when they were searching using only the brand name as a
query.
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54. Other recent research confirms the heterogeneity of searches, even brand-specific searches.69
Searchers want and expect a variety of different things from their searches.
55. Contrary to Professor Goodstein’s suggestion that all users want the same thing, this
heterogeneity is important to trademark law because the interests of nonconfused consumers
are often relevant. For ordinary trademark infringement where the competitor is using a
similar mark to the plaintiff’s, the interests of nonconfused consumers will not be much
harmed, except for transition costs, if a defendant is made to use a different mark.
Nonconfused consumers can still ultimately find the producer they like. Thus, there is not
much reason to tolerate net confusion levels of even 15-20%. By contrast, where the
competitor is doing something other than using a similar mark to identify itself—something
that enables it to compete more effectively against the trademark owner—eliminating its
ability to do so will cause harm to the substantial numbers of nonconfused consumers who
are receiving useful information.70 As Michael Grynberg explains:
If broad acceptance of initial interest confusion liability threatens profitable
activities like keyword advertising, judges should address the diminished
availability of information to consumers that would result. A manufacturer of
generic acetaminophen who pays to have his ad displayed as a sponsored link in
response to my Google search for “Tylenol” may be a free rider. But I am not. In
effect, defenders of a broad initial interest confusion doctrine are arguing that I
should refrain from using Tylenol as a search term, no matter how hard
acetaminophen is to spell, unless my interest is in the more expensive branded
product. If there is something wrong with my behavior, courts should articulate
what it is before they deprive me of the ability to search the Internet with the most
information-rich terms available.71
56. It is for this interest-balancing reason that both descriptive fair use (non-trademark use of a
term to describe the defendant’s goods or services) and nominative fair use (use to identify
the trademark owner in order to convey some message about it or about its competitors,
which is one significant use for keyword advertising) are defenses that can override the
presence of consumer confusion that would ordinarily justify judicial intervention.72
57. Consumers’ interests in useful information from competitors is a crucial part of trademark
law generally, but it is also a crucial component of keyword advertising: many consumers
find sponsored ads for competitors to be useful, as Franklyn and Hyman concluded.73
Depriving consumers of useful information about competitors is actively harmful to the
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information environment in a way that suppressing a counterfeiter, or even an ordinary user
of a confusingly similar mark, is not.
58. Professor Goodstein appears to assume that a user conducting a search for “1-800 Contacts”
would only click on a competitor’s sponsored ad because she was confused. However,
Franklyn and Hyman’s research indicates that many consumers would find advertisements
from competitors highly relevant in response to a navigational search for a trademarked term
such as “Mercedes.” Of those who would click on results for “Infiniti,” “BMW,” or
“Gorgeous Luxury Vehicles,” 52%, 53%, and 36% respectively were open to competing
products; between 10-12% were using “Mercedes” as a term to describe the category for
which they were searching; and only 9% expected an affiliation or sponsorship agreement
with Mercedes.74
59. Moreover, Franklyn and Hyman’s work shows that consumers do not see the world the way
trademark owners’ lawyers do, and in particular do not use the same definitions. Franklyn
and Hyman asked their respondents if they had been “diverted” from a search for a brand;
58% responded that they had been (13% were not sure). But, of those who responded
positively, almost 60% reported that “they had been taken to a site that sold or serviced the
product in which they were interested.” As the authors note, “[t]he fact that most
respondents considered being directed to a site that sold or serviced the product in question to
be diversion indicates some of the difficulties with using the concept of diversion as a proxy
for likelihood of confusion or infringement.”75 In addition, most consumers reported that
they did not give up—most of them went back to search again, or visited other sites returned
by the original search.76 Their momentary “diversion” didn’t seem to leave scars.77
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60. Professor Goodstein’s report discusses several surveys by Respondent’s expert Professor Van
Liere that nonetheless attempt to prove that keyword ads are confusing. However, they
generally do not ask the right question, which is whether there is confusion about the legal
source or sponsorship78—a question that ordinary consumers may rarely give much thought
to, and certainly do not know the meaning of without assistance.79 When confusion is not
defined by surveyors in the same way the law defines it, the results are not useful proof of a
legal concept.
61. The American Airlines (“AA”) studies to which Professor Goodstein refers in his report
highlight the problems with eliding different kinds of confusion and ignoring legal
definitions of confusion.80 The first study (conducted by Dr. Van Liere, hired to survey
respondents in the instant case) reports that 23.5% of respondents were confused by the
appearance of “American Airlines” in some of the organic results in the following
screenshot:
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62. When nearly a quarter of survey respondents are coded as being confused about the
Wikipedia entry on American Airlines, “fatal events since 1970 for American Airlines,” and
“news results for American Airlines”—organic results intended to serve as the control for the
study—there is something awry in the survey design that is encouraging them to report
“confusion” at such a significant level. Given the unlikelihood that reasonable consumers
actually believe, and behave as if, Wikipedia, fatal crash reporting sites, and news results are
controlled by American Airlines, the survey appears to have encouraged consumers to report
that every link displayed in response to a search for “American Airlines” is endorsed by
American Airlines; the control stimulus could not control for that problem because the test
stimulus added additional links.
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63. Far more significantly, Goodstein et al. reported that, for this control group, “[r]espondents
who identified one of the two ‘news’ links as being endorsed by the trademark holder were
also counted as confused. The third organic link led to a Wikipedia page endorsed by the
trademark holder.”81 In other words, the survey distinguished between the organic news
links and the Wikipedia link and did not count people who answered that Wikipedia was
“endorsed by” American Airlines as confused.
64. That inconsistency is a fatal flaw for a survey marshalled as support for the claim that
keyword advertising makes confusion about “source or sponsorship” likely. The mere fact
that American Airlines does not mind Wikipedia keeping a page about it does not make that
page, or Wikipedia, legally connected to American Airlines, which is the trademark concept
of confusion over source or sponsorship. American Airlines has no right to stop Wikipedia
from keeping a page about it; AA likewise has no duty to police Wikipedia’s nominative uses
of its marks, which it would have to do if it actually did license its mark to Wikipedia for
trademark use. Because survey respondents were not counted as confused when they thought
Wikipedia was endorsed by American Airlines, but were counted as confused when they
thought that ads that might well allow them to buy tickets on American and other airlines
were endorsed by the carrier, the results have been biased in favor of American Airlines’
claims against the sponsored ads.82 The endorsement “confusion” shown by the controls, if
properly measured, will therefore be higher than reported, making the net confusion lower.
65. This distortion is reinforced by the fact that Professor Van Liere’s survey never attempted to
discern what respondents thought “endorsement” was, or to teach them the surveyors’ private
definition of “endorsement” as something that had been unilaterally conveyed upon an
unrelated website such as Wikipedia, but not upon news sites. Consumers are not experts in
trademark law, and thus asking them “endorsement” questions in a vacuum is likely to
produce meaningless answers. As far as we know, survey respondents were interpreting
“endorsed” to mean that American Airlines “is not trying to stop discussion about itself/is not
trying to stop a site from selling tickets on its planes.” But that interpretation is a far cry
from the legal meaning of confusion over source or sponsorship.
66. Other flaws of Professor Van Liere’s survey – repeated in his survey for the present case –
reinforce these weaknesses. For example, the “test” stimuli fails to test the real-world
condition in which the advertiser’s own ad usually would be the first sponsored result,
assisting consumers in telling the difference between the advertiser and its competitors.
Surveys should, to the extent possible, replicate market conditions, including conditions in
which the trademark owner and its competitors are likely to appear side by side. As one
trademark expert wrote in explaining what kinds of surveys were appropriate in different
marketplace conditions, “[f]or products that are frequently bought or researched on the
Internet, the proximate appearance of two brands in commonly conducted (v. contrived)
GOOGLE searches may well satisfy the [condition that products are sold in proximity to one
81
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another], and stimuli in such instances should be selected to reflect the Internet
environment.”83
67. Likewise, we also do not know how many consumers would have believed that AA endorsed
these websites had they seen them advertised in a generic search for “airlines.” It may seem
obvious that the use of “American Airlines” as the search prompt was important, but it turns
out that some consumers routinely default to answering questions about sponsorship or
affiliation with the names of strong brands, and the only corrective measure for this issue
would be to allow strong brands to prevent new entry, which trademark law has always
refused to do. Although they probably are not thinking anything at all if their attention is not
drawn to the question of source or sponsorship, consumers’ response to inquiries of this sort
often favor well-known brands, and they may make these connections whether or not they
are cued with the name of the prominent brand.84 Roughly five to ten percent of respondents
will say that a famous brand is associated with a control product “just because they have
heard of it.”85 Depending on the product category, the distortions can be even greater: for
some product categories, over forty percent of consumers would name a dominant brand
without even seeing any stimulus to trigger that response.86 Consumer guessing in response
to a prompt about endorsement will thus be high by default and is not itself indicative of
confusion, or of any causal link between the stimulus and the response.
68. Although there is not much case law on point because claims of infringement based solely on
keyword bidding without use in text are so rare, the general Lanham Act case law is clear
that confusion must be based on an advertiser’s affirmative acts rather than on the presence
of competition in the market, which is a causation requirement that follows from basic
principles of tort liability.87 Suppose that some consumers mistakenly believe that 1-800
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only useful as evidence of actual confusion if it replicates the conditions in which instances of actual confusion,
whether of the ‘source’ or ‘initial interest’ variety, would occur.”); 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 32:163 (“the
closer the survey methods mirror the situation in which the ordinary person would encounter the trademark, the
greater evidentiary weight of the survey results”).
84
Michel Tuan Pham and Gita Venkataramani Johar, Market Prominence Biases in Sponsor Identification:
Processes and Consequentiality, 18 PSYCH. & MARKETING 123, 124-25 (2001).
85
Eugene P. Ericksen & Melissa A. Pittaoulis, Control Groups in Lanham Act Surveys, 104 TRADEMARK REP. 744,
752 (2014) (“For example, in a pilot survey in which the control product was a local pizza brand from a different
state, none of the respondents identified it correctly, but 7, 9, and 11 percent of them said it was Domino’s, Papa
John’s, and Pizza Hut, respectively.”)
86
Jerre B. Swann, Likelihood of Confusion, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND DESIGN 53, 62 (Shari Seidman Diamond & Jerre B. Swann eds., 2012).
87
Pharmacia Corp. v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare, L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 594, 604 (D.N.J. 2003)
(control must control for preexisting beliefs); see also 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. 24/7 Tribeca Fitness, LLC., 447
F. Supp. 2d 266, 280–281 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he survey does not adequately distinguish between [survey]
respondents confused because of the name and those confused because the two facilities appear to offer a similar
service, that is, 24-hour access.”), judgment aff’d, 247 Fed. App’x 232 (2d Cir. 2007); Millennium Laboratories, Inc.
v. Ameritox, Ltd., 924 F. Supp. 2d 594, 601 (D. Md. 2013) (“To be valid, a survey must demonstrate consumer
confusion attributable to the challenged advertisement rather than some other source. Absent a proper control, it is
nearly impossible to determine how much of the reported confusion is attributable to the survey participants’
preexisting beliefs or other background ‘noise’ created when, for example, a participant misunderstands the survey
questions or responds to them inarticulately.”); Janis K. Pappalardo, The Role of Consumer Research in Evaluating
Deception: An Economist’s Perspective, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 793, 804 (1997) (“Failing to control for factors such as
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Contacts is the only online seller of, or even a generic term for, contact lenses; these
consumers mistakenly answer that every search advertisement for a seller of contact lenses
(whether triggered by the keyword “1-800 Contacts” or by the keyword “contact lenses”),
comes from 1-800 Contacts. Trademark law does not recognize this confusion as giving rise
to an infringement claim, because nothing about the competitor’s “use” of a mark has caused
that confusion. It is for this reason that, as Dr. Jacoby has concluded with respect to the
surveys conducted in this proceeding, Jacoby Report at 14-15, an appropriate control should
ask respondents to evaluate search results in response to a generic term to see how many
nonetheless mentioned the trademark owner.88 A control group stimulus should share as
many characteristics with the test stimulus as possible, other than the characteristic whose
influence is being assessed.89 In this case, the key characteristic is that the searcher used the
trademark in her search, because the core of 1-800 Contacts’ argument is that the searcher’s
use of the trademark generates confusion over sponsored ads regardless of the non-use of the
trademark in the resulting ad text. However, Professor Van Liere failed to use the search
term as the control in the American Airlines study, and again here.
69. Finally, the evidence relied on by Professor Goodstein highlights a contradiction with other
claims made in both his own report and Mr. Hogan’s. In the survey results, consumers are
apparently distinguishing organic from sponsored results at high rates—this is what creates
the gap between control and test stimuli. These results conflict, however, with the general
results Professor Goodstein, and the other experts referencing his report, cite to indicate that
consumers are not good at consciously identifying which parts of a search result are organic
and which sponsored.90 This conflict underscores both Professor Goodstein’s and Mr.
Hogan’s failure to distinguish trademark confusion from other kinds of confusion and their
conflation of “distraction” with “confusion”: they want to treat both types of research as
evidence that consumers will be confused about the source of sponsored ads, when what the
gap between these results really indicates is that consumers asked consciously to reflect on
different aspects of the search process (organic versus sponsored, or source of the ads) can
preexisting beliefs when assessing advertising is like failing to control for placebo effects when assessing drug
efficacy. In essence, the failure is tantamount to giving a drug credit for the placebo effect. Moreover, unless one
tests for the placebo effect, one will not know the extent to which a drug’s effect would be overstated absent a
placebo effect control. Similarly, unless one tests for the effects of preexisting beliefs, one will not know the extent
to which the effects of a potentially deceptive ad are overstated absent a preexisting belief control.”).
88
See Itamar Simonson & Ran Kivetz, Demand Effects in Likelihood of Confusion Surveys: The Importance of
Marketplace Conditions, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN 243,
250-55 (Shari Seidman Diamond & Jerre B. Swann eds., 2012). As Simonson & Kivetz summarize:
[S]ome (or many) respondents may suspect, for example, that the survey designer knows something about
the true relations between the two brands that the respondents do not know. Once they form such a
(demand-based) hypothesis, survey respondents may seek clues (e.g., a similarity on a certain dimension or
some other justification) that support the guess that the presented brands are related in some manner. The
respondent-provided explanations will often not be very informative in such cases, because they will tend
to refer to the available clues and may thus falsely appear to confirm the alleged cause of confusion.
Furthermore, while such demand effects may (or may not) be reflected in an unusually high level of
“confusion” in the control group, by design, the difference between the test and control stimuli may elicit
different explanations.
Id. at 251 (footnote omitted).
89
Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 399 (3d. ed. 2011).
90
E.g., Goodstein Report, para. 52 and passim. See also Hogan Report, para. 7, 81.
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produce very different answers, but those answers bear no necessary connection to true
confusion over source or sponsorship.91
70. According to the research relied on by Professor Goodstein to form his opinions, consumers
learn which parts of the screen contain ads, and scan those parts differently.92 Searchers may
not be consciously aware of or able to label their tacit knowledge,93 but their behavior clearly
indicates distinctions between sponsored ads and organic. For example, consumers seem to
spend less time looking at ads than at organic results, and are less likely to click through
sponsored links than organic links.94
71. However, consumers cannot explain which results are which when asked. This inability to
answer “why” questions or explain one’s own reasoning without actually altering that
reasoning and making the responses misleading is a well-known phenomenon in the
psychology literature,95 but it does not mean that consumers are as vulnerable and easily
confused about source or sponsorship as Professor Goodstein concludes.
72. Ultimately, to answer a question about actionable confusion, it is important to ask questions
that reliably map onto the protections provided by trademark law: primarily, protection
against consumer confusion about source or sponsorship, in the sense of a trademark owner
standing behind the product or service at issue, caused by similarities in the parties’ marks.
Other connections, other sources of confusion, and other kinds of confusion are outside the
purview of trademark law—and do not have the same harmful impact on competition or on
consumers. As Professor Goldman and Mr. Reyes noted in their article on the subject, “[to
say that consumers aren’t confused about source or sponsorship by keyword ads] is not to say
91

See, e.g., Goodstein at 30 (equating diversion with confusion and confusion over source with confusion over the
reason an ad showed up on a webpage).
92
MEDIATIVE, THE EVOLUTION OF GOOGLE SEARCH RESULTS PAGES & THEIR EFFECT ON USER BEHAVIOR 17
(2014) (“The #1 Organic Listing still captures the most click activity (32.8%), regardless of what new elements are
presented”); id. at 21 (“The top organic result is no longer always in the top left corner, so we see initial gaze going
to a number of different elements.”); id. at 40-41 (finding that eye tracking behavior differs when only organic
results are present).
93
See Bretton H. Talbot et al., The Verbal Overshadowing Effect: Influence on Perception, 4 INTUITION 12, 12, 17
(2008) (where a stimulus is “difficult to explain in words but easily recognized,” verbal reports of perception
become unreliable; when people attempt to articulate the reasons for their perceptions, “their thoughts about the
perception are disrupted. A shift occurs from a normal cognitive process to a more analytical procedure and thus
affects the outcome.”).
94
Mediative, at 14 & 57 (“The average duration of a look at one of the top sponsored ads was only 0.36 seconds.”);
76; Communication w/Andreanne St. Pierre, Brand Director, Mediative (indicating that the time someone spent
looking at an individual listing as a whole, including an individual listing in the organic results, averaged 1.17s).
95
When users are prompted by a question asking why they act or believe something they usually do not examine, it
causes them to overanalyze what they are doing, and to offer explanations for responses that they may not fully
understand. That skews the results. Shari Seidman Diamond, Control Foundations: Rationales and Approaches, in
TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN 201, 211 (Shari Seidman
Diamond & Jerre B. Swann eds., 2012) (explaining that “why” answers are unreliable—respondents just don’t
know; some give reasons that don’t actually describe the stimulus or otherwise don’t make sense); see also Talbot,
supra; MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 180–81, 186 (2005) (stating
that asking “why” questions distorts respondents’ reactions, making their answers unreliable gauges for ordinary
situations where much processing is consciously inaccessible (citing Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler,
Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1991))).
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consumers do not experience confusion about the keyword ads they see. Instead, consumers
routinely experience all types of confusion during their shopping experiences, but trademark
law only protects against very specific types of confusion.”96 Like the classic “negligence in
the air,” “confusion in the air” is not actionable—especially when overly aggressive attempts
to suppress all confusion, no matter how immaterial to consumers, may also suppress useful
comparative advertising.97
D.

The Trademark Remedies Mr. Hogan Invokes Have Not Been
Imposed in the Case Law for Keyword Bidding Alone

73. Mr. Hogan contends that 1-800 Contacts’ remedies are supportable and widely accepted in
trademark disputes.98 But the evidence does not support his conclusion. For example, my
understanding is that 1-800 Contacts sought agreements with companies such as Walgreens
who were not bidding on any of 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks, but were appearing on search
results pages in response to search queries for the phrase “1-800 Contacts,” either because
the company bid on the generic term “contacts,” or because the search engine deemed the
advertisement relevant to the information sought and “broad-matched” the advertisement into
the search results page.99 Agreements with such companies cover conduct that could not be
infringing, even under Respondent’s experts’ expansive conception of trademark use,
because the party was never affirmatively bidding on a trademark, but merely failing to
exclude strings that turned out to include the trademark (because the trademark included a
generic word).100 As far as I am aware, no U.S. case has ever held that such “non-use” could
be infringing, let alone ordered relief to remedy such conduct.
74. Mr. Hogan highlights negative keyword provisions in settlements and court orders to suggest
that courts regularly adopt or impose similar restrictions to those at issue in this case.
However, these negative keyword provisions in settlements or orders almost universally deal
with a different class of defendants—defendants who used a confusingly similar mark to
identify themselves—and also with a different class of terms—terms that are not generic.
Requiring an infringer who has used a confusingly similar mark to label its own goods and
services to stop using that mark, even to the point of requiring negative keywords, is very
different from the conduct required under 1-800 Contacts’ bidding agreements. In my view,
the reason that 1-800 Contacts found the negative keyword requirement important is that it
adopted a mark that is comprised of highly common and, for “contacts,” generic terms.
Although 1-800 Contacts is entitled to trademark protection for the mark as a whole, it must
live with its choice in terms of the leeway to which other competitors are entitled in order to
allow them to compete effectively.101
96

Goldman & Reyes, 111 n.42 (citing Ronald C. Goodstein et al., Using Trademarks as Keywords: Empirical
Evidence of Confusion, 105 TRADEMARK REP. 732 (2015), and Franklyn & Hyman, supra).
97
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 341 (1928) (Cardozo, J.). Cf. Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros.
Entm’t, Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 700-01 (7th Cir. 2014) (“But general confusion ‘in the air’ is not actionable. Rather, only
confusion about ‘origin, sponsorship, or approval of ... goods’ supports a trademark claim.”).
98
Hogan Report Section X.
99
See, e.g., CX0849-001.
100
See 1–800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 410 (2d Cir. 2005).
101
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004) (“‘If any confusion results,
that is a risk the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with a mark that uses a well known
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75. There is no evidence that the remedies Mr. Hogan defends are “common” for any group of
defendants. Thousands of trademark suits are filed and settled every year; Mr. Hogan
identifies only a handful.102 For most settlements, the terms are never reported. In terms of
negotiating to a remedy that courts would be able to impose, there is simply not much in the
way of case law because of the brute fact that defendants who buy trademarks as keywords
routinely win these cases when litigated to conclusion.
76. Mr. Hogan indeed lists a number of cases where injunctive relief that includes a ban on
keyword advertising has been granted. Hogan Report at 61-68, para. 104-08, & 97-105, para.
149-51. But almost every one of these cases involves actual counterfeiting by the defendant,
such as Chloe Sas v. Sawabeh Information Services Co., No. 11-cv-04147 (C.D. Cal. July 8,
2014), ECF No. 728, or at the very least use by the defendant of a mark confusingly similar
to the plaintiff’s as its trademark for its own product or services (either in its advertising or
more comprehensively in all its sales), rather than mere purchase of the plaintiff’s mark as a
keyword. A number of these cases are default judgments, the details of which are rarely
scrutinized with care by courts. These cases do not suggest the existence of successful cases
against competitors who are only buying keyword ads, or who are advertising using
descriptive or generic terms and decline to use negative keyword matching.
77. Judgments or stipulated orders against defendants who used plaintiffs’ marks as the brand
name of their own goods or services include:
x
x
x
x
x
x

Global Tel-Link Corp. v. Jail Call Services, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-1557, 2015 WL
1936502 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2015);
Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, No. CV-05-2656-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL
1743189, at *8 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010), Hogan Exh. C;
Young Again Products, Inc. v. Acord, No. RWT 03CV2441 (D. Md. Mar. 25,
2009), ECF No. 264;
CJ Products LLC v. Snuggly Plushez LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
22, 2011) (dealing with infringement of plaintiff’s Pillow Pet trademarks and its
copyrights);
PODS Enterprises., LLC v. U-Haul International, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1263,
1292 (M.D. Fla. 2015), Hogan Exh. D; and
J-Rich Clinic, Inc. v. Cosmedic Concepts, No. 02-cv-74324 (E.D. Mich. 2006),
Hogan Exh. U.103

descriptive phrase.’”) (quoting Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough–Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30
(2d Cir. 1997)).
102
Lex Machina, Trademark Litigation Report 2016, at 1, Fig. 3 (showing 1281 TROs, 1809 preliminary
injunctions, and 6854 permanent injunctions for cases filed Jan. 2009-Mar. 2016); see also id. at 3, Fig. 4 (showing
7765 trademark cases with granted injunctions of any kind for the same period); id. at 5, Fig. 12 (showing 1057
consent judgments, 3365 default judgments, 55 judgments on the pleadings, 1207 summary judgments, 558 trials,
and 38 judgments as a matter of law in cases terminated Jan. 2009-Mar. 2016); id. at 7, Fig. 15 (finding that there
were likely 17,238 settlements in trademark cases terminated Jan. 2009-Mar. 2016).
103
In J-Rich, the parties stipulated only to preliminary injunctive relief, with the proviso that the stipulated order
would not constitute a binding admission or concession by either party. Stipulation to Entry of Order for
Preliminary Injunctive Relief, J-Rich Clinic, Inc. v. Cosmedic Concepts, No. 02-cv-74324 (E.D. Mich. filed May 16,
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78. Default judgments against infringers who used plaintiff’s mark as the brand name of their
own goods or services include:
x
x
x
x

Partners for Health & Home, L.P. v. Yang, No. CV 09-07849 (CBM) (RZx) (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 13, 2010), ECF No. 46, Hogan Exh. G;
Quidgeon v. Olsen, No. 10-cv-1168, 2011 WL 1480537, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 19,
2011), Hogan Exh. H;
World Entertainment Inc. v. Brown, No. 09-5365, 2011 WL 2036686 (E.D. Pa.
May 20, 2011), Hogan Exh. I; and
Happy Feet USA, Inc. v. Serenity “2000” Corp., No. 09-cv-1832 (Dkt. 22) (M.D.
Fl. Mar. 16, 2010), Hogan Exh. Z, where the plaintiff’s mark for its foot care
products was Happy Feet, and the defendant’s advertising was as shown:

79. The remainder of the cases against advertisers discussed by Mr. Hogan almost exclusively
involve the use of the plaintiff’s mark as the bolded text of the defendant’s ad:
x

In Hogan Exhibit N, the plaintiff’s mark for lending services was QuickClick, and
the defendant’s ad was:

x

In Exhibit O, the plaintiff’s mark was G&G Bonds for bail bonds, and the
defendant’s ad was:

2006), ECF No. 359. The case was ultimately dismissed on stipulation by the parties. Order Dismissing Actions
with Prejudice, J-Rich Clinic, Inc. v. Cosmedic Concepts, No. 02-cv-74324 (E.D. Mich. filed Dec. 4, 2006), ECF
No. 388.
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x

In Exhibit S, the plaintiff’s mark for hair restoration services was Elliott & True,
and the defendants who agreed to the injunction shown in Exhibit S used the
following ad:

104

80. In other words, the class of defendants against whom such relief has generally been granted,
by default or in a consent judgment, differs from those who are merely engaged in keyword
purchasing. It is understandable that a defendant deliberately using a plaintiff’s mark to
identify itself to consumers might also be enjoined from using that mark as a keyword.105
81. Based on my review of the underlying complaints, only one case in Mr. Hogan’s report,
Exhibit P, involved a consent injunction against a defendant who was not allegedly using
plaintiff’s mark as the text of its ads; as discussed above, that defendant had challenged the
validity of plaintiff’s mark, but not its confusion theory.106 That case also involved
allegations of copyright infringement in the underlying website to which defendants linked.
In a subsequent case brought by the same plaintiff involving similar allegations, the plaintiff
dropped its trademark claims and settled only the copyright claims. Permanent Injunction
104

Exhibit S is part of a larger case against multiple defendants, including search engines. While plaintiff initially
also sued defendants who did not, as far as the exhibits show, use its mark in ad text, it voluntarily dismissed that
complaint. Plaintiff then refiled, omitting the defendants who had not used the mark in ad text. (The refiled
complaint repeated all the factual allegations against those former defendants, but after amendment of the complaint
they, along with the search engines, were identified as non-parties.) See Second Amended Complaint, True & Dorin
Med. Grp., P.C. v. Leavitt Med. Assocs., P.A., No. 06-cv-00092 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2006), ECF No. 65.
105
Specifically, the competitor used a confusingly similar mark for its own goods or services in Exhs. C, D, G, H, I,
J, M, U, Z, and AA. The defendant was a counterfeiter in Exhs. E and F. Exhs. E-J inclusive are default judgments,
where the text is proposed by the plaintiff and rarely scrutinized in any detail by the court. The defendant used the
trademark in title of its ad in Exhs. L, N, O, S, and DD; in Exh. L, there is no injunction against keyword buys, only
against using the trademark in the ad text. In Exh. R, the defendant was a cybersquatter using a confusingly similar
domain name. In Exhs. V, W, X, and Y, the defendant allegedly used the mark and domain names to generate popup ads (and this conduct, targeting pop-up ads, was ultimately determined to be noninfringing as a matter of law, 1800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); Allen v. IM Sols., LLC, 94 F. Supp. 3d 1216 (E.D.
Okla. 2015)). See also Dazzlesmile, LLC v. Epic Advertising, Inc., 9-cv-1043 (D. Utah Mar. 22, 2010), MSFT0000029.pdf (a case involving counterfeiting and cybersquatting). Three settlements, Exhs. Q, BB, and CC,
involved search entities and not competitors, who have different incentives with respect to settlement.
106
Exhibit K involves a competitor/critic who was enjoined from buying keywords to run critical ads; the case
involved false advertising and right of publicity claims as well. The settlement does not specify the basis for
settlement, but given the clearly disparaging nature of the ads, a valid trademark confusion claim is inherently
unlikely. In addition, I was unable to tell what kind of keyword ads were involved in the conduct underlying the
settlement in Exhibit T.
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and Judgment on Consent, FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com Inc., No. 06-cv-02225
(E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 6, 2013), ECF No. 273.
82. Thus, despite the numerous cases Mr. Hogan cites in his report, as far as the public record
reveals, no court has ever found liability based solely on keyword bidding. And in keyword
bidding cases where defendants have vigorously contested the case, settlements seem to
favor allowing keyword purchases to continue, as was shown when Amazon’s confidential
settlement terms were revealed in a related case:
[A] dispute over the settlement agreement in a keyword advertising trademark
lawsuit against Amazon.com means we get to see the formerly confidential terms.
The settlement terms highly favor Amazon,…In general, this looks like a pretty
sweet settlement for Amazon. It doesn’t pay a dime and can keep buying keyword
ads on “Baiden.”107
83. Moreover, none of these cases Mr. Hogan cites involves prohibitions on “broad matching”
where the plaintiff’s composite mark includes a generic term that is a natural search term for
the defendant’s products or services. Even defendants who were deliberately infringing were
still permitted to buy ads that could appear on a search engine results page for a generic
keyword search. Likewise, none of these cases involves a requirement of negative keyword
use for generic terms.108 The only similar case of which I am aware, Rhino Sports, Inc. v.
Sport Court, Inc., specifically rejected the claim that a sports equipment company’s purchase
of “courts” and “basketball court” violated a permanent injunction against use of its
competitor’s SPORT COURT mark or variations thereof. “The Court concludes that a
contrary interpretation of the permanent injunction would not be reasonable because it would
preclude Rhino Sports from using these generic terms as keywords.”109
84. Even if a court had found infringement for keyword bidding alone, the remedies Mr. Hogan
points to would not provide an appropriate model for court-ordered relief in such a case. A
court finding infringement would need to be careful to limit the remedies granted to preserve
107

Eric Goldman, Want To Know Amazon’s Confidential Settlement Terms For a Keyword Advertising Lawsuit?
Merry Christmas!, Dec. 26, 2013, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/12/26/want-to-know-amazonsconfidential-settlement-terms-for-a-keyword-advertising-lawsuit-merry-christmas/#5f907e00575b (discussing Sen
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2013 WL 6730180 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2013)).
108
The court of appeals in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1243 (10th Cir. 2013), suggested
that the district court’s reasoning on a related point “has some attraction,” but did not reach the question in affirming
summary judgment for the defendant. The relevant part of the district court opinion concluded that, because buying
the generic term “contacts” might trigger an ad for a search on “1-800 contacts,” the purchase of trademarks alone,
without consideration of ad text, could not be infringing. As the court of appeals noted, previous cases have held
that a defendant’s failure to avoid an association triggered by consumers’ reactions to non-trademark uses cannot, as
a matter of law, be infringing, a conclusion that would defeat any claim based on failure to attach negative keywords
to the generic keyword purchase “contacts.” See id. (citing Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619,
625–26 (6th Cir.1996) (defendants did not infringe any rights when they used a common misdialing of the plaintiff’s
telephone number, regardless of confusion); see also DISH Network, LLC v. Fun Dish, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 627
(N.D. Ohio. 2015) (same).
109
2007 WL 1302745, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2007) (citing, inter alia, America Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243
F.3d 812, 823 (4th Cir. 2001) (“functional use of words within the heartland of their ordinary meaning cannot give
rise to a trademark”)).
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competition. Given trademark’s policy of balancing different interests in consumer
information, remedies must be carefully tailored. Courts have consistently underscored this
point, including in cases cited by Mr. Hogan:
x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Injunctive
relief under the Lanham Act must be narrowly tailored to the scope of the issues tried in
the case.”);
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[A] trademark injunction should be tailored to prevent ongoing violations, not punish
past conduct. Speakers do not lose the right to engage in permissible speech simply
because they may have infringed a trademark in the past”; “At the very least, the
injunction must be modified to allow some use of the Lexus mark in domain names by
the Tabaris. Trademarks are part of our common language, and we all have some right to
use them to communicate in truthful, non-misleading ways.”);
PACCAR v. TeleScan Techs. LLC, 319 F.3d 243, 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (“In light of the
district court’s failure to consider whether TeleScan’s use of the “Peterbilt” and
“Kenworth” marks in its metatags alone, without the inclusion of those marks in the
domain names, creates a likelihood of confusion, we believe that the scope of the
injunction is too broad.”);
Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2003) (a
permanent injunction in a trademark case should be narrowly tailored to fit specific legal
violations and should not impose unnecessary burdens on lawful activity; injunction
specifying distinguishing presentation to be used may be appropriate);
CPC Int’l v. Skippy, 214 F.3d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court has
recognized the risks of overbroad injunctions, especially when First Amendment
considerations are at stake.”); id. (“[a] trademark injunction . . . can raise serious First
Amendment concerns [as] it can interfere with truthful communication between buyers
and sellers in the marketplace.”) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1976));
A & H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir.1999)
(noting that mandatory disclaimers or house marks may be appropriate remedies);
George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1542 (2d Cir. 1992) (if “injunctive
relief is warranted, ‘the relief granted should be no broader than necessary to cure the
effects of the harm caused.’”) (quoting Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832
F.2d 1325, 1329–30 (2d Cir. 1987));
Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 701 (1st Cir. 1987) (court will
vacate any provision in an injunction that, instead of “affirmatively mandating that [a
party] better identify the genealogy of its wares, … effectively took [its] products off the
market.”);
Anhing Corp. v. Thuan Phong Co., 2015 WL 4517846, at *25 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015)
(“The Court is mindful that although Defendant’s present use is not fair, an appropriate
injunction must not limit Defendant’s fair use rights … Thus, the public interest favors a
tailored injunction prohibiting future trademark infringement while permitting fair use.”;
defendant could not be entirely enjoined from using challenged term on front of package
or required to make it “entirely inconspicuous”);
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x

x
x

x

x

Chanel, Inc. v. Charles, 2016 WL 4491871, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 9, 2016) (citations
omitted) (“Generally, an injunction must be narrowly tailored to remedy only the specific
harms shown by a plaintiff, rather than to enjoin all possible breaches of the law. … The
court looked at similar injunctions in other cases as part of its effort to tailor the
injunction. The cases generally prohibited only trademark infringement and the other
wrongful conduct alleged in the litigation. …”);
PODS Enters., LLC v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1263, 1287-93 (M.D. Fla.
2015) (holding that plaintiff’s proposed injunction was too broad because it “would
prohibit the use of comparative advertising”);
Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 661 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (allowing
continued keyword advertising by unauthorized seller of legitimate goods; “[T]he law
will destroy the valuable resource that search engines have become if it prevents those
search engines from doing what they are designed to do: present users with the
information they seek as well as related information the user may also find helpful or
interesting.”);
Palantir Techs., Inc. v. Palantir.net, Inc., No. C 07-03863, 2008 WL 152339, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 15, 2008) (holding that “a preliminary injunction need not enjoin PTI’s use of
‘palantir’ in total” and instead requiring the defendant “to place a prominent disclaimer
on its website that advises viewers it is not Palantir.net and directs viewers to Palantir.net
if that is what they are seeking”); and
Tancogne v. Tomjai Enterprises Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1243 (S.D. Fla. 2005)
(“[E]quitable relief in a trademark case should be narrowly tailored to cure the ongoing
harm by distinguishing the infringing product from the original ...”) (citing B.H. Bunn
Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1269 (5th Cir. 1971)).

85. Following this principle, the proper remedy for a finding of infringement would be (1) to bar
the confusing use of a plaintiff’s trademark in the text of an ad, and/or (2) to require clear
labeling of the source of the ad. It would even be possible, although not necessary, to require
clear comparative language such as “better than 1-800 Contacts” or “cheaper than 1-800
Contacts” or “we beat 1-800 Contacts’ prices.”110 Courts have made clear that proper
labeling satisfies a seller’s obligations; reasonable consumers can use labeling to distinguish
the source of ads.111 Mr. Hogan’s contention that smaller competitors whose names are not
currently immediately recognizable should not be allowed to compete is not consistent with
the case law, which does not favor more famous brands in the ability to run keyword ads—
and it is worth noting that, before 1-800 Contacts reached its present level of awareness, such
a rule would have prevented it from competing with existing sellers.112
110

Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he labeling and
appearance of the products for sale on Amazon’s web page is the most important factor in this case. This is because
we have previously noted that clear labeling can eliminate the likelihood of initial interest confusion in cases
involving Internet search terms.… Here, the products at issue are clearly labeled by Amazon to avoid any likelihood
of initial interest confusion by a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to online shopping. When a shopper goes
to Amazon’s website and searches for a product using MTM’s trademark “mtm special ops,” the resulting page
displays several products, all of which are clearly labeled with the product’s name and manufacturer in large, bright,
bold letters ….”).
111
Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced System Concepts, Inc., 638 F. 3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011).
112
See 1-800 Contacts v. Lens.com, 2012 WL 113812, at *2, *4 (D. Utah Jan. 13, 2012) (“1–800 Contacts had
derived $219,314 in profits off of those keyword purchases compared to Lens.com’s $20.51. Thus, 1–800 Contacts
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86. Mr. Hogan also implies that failure to police a trademark as 1-800 Contacts has done could
lead to the abandonment of trademark rights. Hogan Report para. 25-31. While
abandonment certainly can occur under appropriate circumstances, it is largely irrelevant in
the context of comparative advertising, where the defendant has not adopted the trademark
owner’s name as its own. Moreover, courts are extremely forgiving to trademark owners in
abandonment claims, rejecting them so long as the trademark continues to identify a single
source. For example, courts and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have found that
university mascots and names have retained trademark significance despite uncontrolled use
by others for decades and, in one case, for nearly two centuries.113 Furthermore, the Patent
and Trademark Office has specifically ruled that, given that trademark owners have no
clearly established right to control keyword advertising, trademark owners need not police
against keyword advertising to avoid abandonment.114 Thus, there is no basis for Mr.
Hogan’s claim that the aggressive restrictions contained in the settlement agreements at issue
are necessary to prevent 1-800 Contacts from losing its trademark rights.
IV.

Respondent’s Experts Wrongly Suggest That Trademark Dilution Also Justifies
1-800 Contacts’ Bidding Agreements

87. Mr. Hogan’s and Professor Goodstein’s reports also address trademark dilution.115 In order
to rebut their conclusions, I will lay out the proper framework for trademark dilution.
Trademark dilution actions are distinct from trademark infringement claims in that they focus
not on preventing confusion but, rather, on preserving the uniqueness of the plaintiff’s mark.
This concept entered the American lexicon in 1937 with Frank Schechter’s law review
article, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection.116 Dilution has been defined as use by
the defendant of a mark for its own goods and services that is so similar to the plaintiff’s as
to diminish the distinctiveness of or tarnish the plaintiff’s mark. The classic examples are
products such as Kodak soap or Pillsbury sex toys: uses on non-competing goods. Hogan
Report para. 54. As is evident from this description, dilution requires the defendant to use a
similar mark to identify itself. While the Second Circuit once flirted with the idea that
altering a plaintiff’s mark in a demeaning way could be actionable,117 the subsequent
was suing Lens.com for the same activity in which it had engaged…. 1–800 Contacts’ actions raise questions about
vexatious suits to defeat competition,” though ultimately a fee award was not added to sanctions already imposed);
see also Dhruv Grewal et al., Comparative Versus Noncomparative Advertising: A Meta-Analysis, 61 J. MARKETING
1, 1 (1997) (“New brands comparing themselves to established brands appear to benefit most from comparative
advertising.”).
113
See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 171 (M.D.N.C.
1989) (noting marks did not lose significance as indications of origin despite substantial uncontrolled use of marks
by third parties from 1795 until 1982); Univ. Book Store v. Univ. of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385
(T.T.A.B. 1994) (noting a similar finding with uncontrolled use from the 1940s until the 1990s).
114
STK LLC v. Backrack, Inc., Cancellation No. 92049332, 2012 WL 2024459 (TTAB May 21, 2012).
115
Hogan Report Section VI; Goodstein Report Section VI. The Landes Report also claims that dilution is possible
from “increased search costs” due to initial interest confusion, but that conflates dilution with confusion. Landes
Report at 14-15.
116
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927).
117
In this case, the court of appeals still maintained that simply using a competitor’s mark couldn’t be dilutive.
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Sellers of commercial products may wish to use a
competitor’s mark to identify the competitor’s product in comparative advertisements. As long as the mark is not
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adoption of federal dilution law has made clear that the defendant must use a mark to identify
itself in order to dilute. To avoid all doubt, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006
included an explicit exception for all forms of comparative advertising.
88. The federal statute, 15 U.S.C. §1125, currently provides:
(3) Exclusions
The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment under this subsection:
(A)
Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use,
or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another
person other than as a designation of source for the
person’s own goods or services, including use in
connection with—
(i)
advertising or promotion that permits
consumers to compare goods or services; or
(ii)
identifying and parodying, criticizing, or
commenting upon the famous mark owner
or the goods or services of the famous mark
owner.
89. In invoking dilution as a justification for 1-800 Contacts’ bidding agreements, Mr. Hogan
and Professor Goodstein ignore the statutory exclusion, which disposes of any such claim
based on keyword advertising. Courts have recognized online advertising as falling within
this exclusion. Specifically, a number of cases have rejected dilution claims based on
keyword advertising:
x

x
x
x
x

Allied Interstate LLC v. Kimmel & Silverman P.C., No. 12 Civ. 4204, 2013 WL 4245987
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) (“To the extent that Defendants’ advertising permits viewers to
compare Defendants’ potentially competitive services with those of the Plaintiff, … its
use of Allied’s mark falls within Section 1125(c)(3)(A)(i)’s exclusion of comparative
advertising from the scope of actionable dilution.”);
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in
relevant part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010);
Designer Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811 (D. Ariz. 2008)
(nominative use);
Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. C02-2420RSM, 2006 WL
3761367 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 2006) (relying on similar, but differently worded, preTrademark Dilution Revision Act provisions); and
Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064
(D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (same).

altered, such use serves the beneficial purpose of imparting factual information about the relative merits of
competing products and poses no risk of diluting the selling power of the competitor’s mark .”) (internal citation
omitted); see also Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining
that the Second Circuit had not meant to expand the concept of dilution under New York law).
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90. Likewise, association between competing products based on mere physical proximity cannot
constitute dilution, a conclusion that logically extends to physical proximity on a webpage.118
While the Court of Appeals in Rosetta Stone found that summary judgment for Google on
dilution claims was improper, (1) again, those claims included counterfeiters’ use of the
Rosetta Stone mark in ad text, and (2) the court found that the district court had not fully
analyzed the elements of nominative fair use as a defense, and said nothing about the proper
outcome of a full review on the merits.119
91. To the best of my knowledge, keyword advertising alone, without use of the plaintiff’s mark
to identify the defendant’s products, has never supported a successful dilution claim, no
matter how famous the mark. Thus, contrary to the suggestion made by Mr. Hogan and
Professor Goodstein, 1-800 Contacts could not have secured anti-dilution protection against
the use of comparative keyword advertising because there is no statutory basis for liability.
And in those states that recognize a state-law dilution cause of action, courts generally
interpret state dilution laws, even if differently worded, in pari materia with the federal law,
especially as to the exceptions.120
92. If anything, the claims in 1-800 Contacts’ expert reports showcase the wisdom of the
statutory exclusions. The concept of dilution espoused by Professor Goodstein defines
changing a consumer’s thoughts about a trademark as dilution, including creation of
associations between the trademark owner and its competitors:
[S]ponsored ads by other contact lens retailers that appear in response to an
Internet search for “1-800 Contacts” could reasonably be expected to harm the
value of 1-800 Contacts by causing consumers to associate other retailers with
that trademark or by causing consumers to associate that trademark with negative
experiences caused by other retailers.121
118

Toni & Guy (USA) Ltd. v. Nature’s Therapy, Inc., 2006 WL 1153354, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006)
(“Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s mark is a comparative advertisement and ‘poses no risk of diluting the selling power
of the competitor's mark;’ rather, it allows consumers to compare the ‘relative merits of competing products.’ And,
because such (comparative) use is specifically excluded under the federal trademark dilution statute, Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's federal dilution claim is granted. … Plaintiff does not claim that
defendant has distorted plaintiff’s mark. It says only that the ‘physical association’ of the Sweet ’N Low trademark
with the Sweetmate trademark will cause blurring. ‘Physical association’ in a comparative advertisement is hardly
likely to cause dilution.”) (citations omitted).
119
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 170 (4th Cir. 2012). (“If the district court determines that
Rosetta Stone has made a prima facie showing under the elements [of dilution], it should reexamine the nominative
fair-use defense in light of this opinion.”).
120
See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that eBay’s referential use of
Tiffany’s mark, rather than use to identify separate goods or services, precluded dilution liability under New York
and federal law, despite the different statutory language for state dilution); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos,
Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that Florida dilution law would not prevent referential uses, given
First Amendment concerns); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the
same analysis to a state law dilution claim under California’s antidilution statute as a federal dilution claim under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act); World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d
413, 443 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that state and federal dilution inquiry was the same except for fame); CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 14247 (following Model State Trademark Law provision on dilution, including exclusions for “any
fair use,” including comparative advertising, and descriptive or nominative use of the mark).
121
Goodstein Report at 4.
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93. Stripped of its generalities, this account lacks coherence. If the consumer did not simply
click back based on an unappealing website, the consumer would have to remember (even
subconsciously) that she searched for 1-800 Contacts, buy from a completely different source
with a different name, wait at least several days, receive the competing product, have a bad
experience with that source (despite the lack of any apparent evidence in the record that
competitors provide bad experiences), and associate the memory of the search for 1-800
Contacts with that bad experience. This is not a plausible description of consumer memory
or behavior.
94. There are other significant problems with the empirics of Professor Goodstein’s argument.
Most significantly, the theory ignores the effects of 1-800 Contacts’ own advertising, which
the reports elsewhere tout as incredibly powerful and successful.122 Even though “other
retailers’ sponsored ads have appeared millions of times between 2010 and 2016 in response
to Internet searches for 1-800 Contacts,”123 1-800 Contacts has survived and, according to its
own account, thrived. 1-800 Contacts reinforces its brand against any erosion in the natural
course of promoting itself.124 Because of the way consumers react to being reminded of
well-known brands, as long as 1-800 Contacts appears in the search results, its brand will
remain distinctive even if consumers do not click on its links.125 Thus, even if we assume
that comparative advertising generated associations between 1-800 Contacts and its
competitors (for example, the association that they compete to provide the same products),
the evidence shows no effect on the distinctiveness of the mark.126

122

E.g., id. at 14 (para. 36).
Id. at 4.
124
Bruce F. Hall, A New Model for Measuring Advertising Effectiveness, J. ADVERTISING RES., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at
23, 25 (“Many, possibly most, target audiences, including the heavy-category users who are critical to the success of
most established brands, will be exposed to the advertising in a continuous loop between post-experience and preexperience, depending on purchase cycles and personal behavior. . . . [T]he advertising will act both to organize
memory of the last usage/purchase experience and to frame perception of the next experience.”).
125
See MEDIATIVE, at 55, 62 (“A previous study by Mediative (http://mdv.to/display-ad-walmart) shows there is
also an increase in brand recognition and purchase intent, even when ads do not match the intent of the searcher. In
these cases, big brands could bid highly for the paid ads as there’s a strong chance that there will be no click, yet the
company name is seen …. If you’re a big name brand, it’s not critical to be the #1 listing.”).
126
As courts uniformly agree, likely harm to distinctiveness is a separate element of dilution apart from association.
Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 168 (“To state a prima facie dilution claim under § 1125(c), a plaintiff must show the
following: (1) that the plaintiff owns a famous mark that is distinctive; (2) that the defendant has commenced using a
mark in commerce that allegedly is diluting the famous mark; (3) that a similarity between the defendant’s mark and
the famous mark gives rise to an association between the marks; and (4) that the association is likely to impair the
distinctiveness of the famous mark or likely to harm the reputation of the famous mark.”) (emphasis added and
quotation marks and citation omitted); Hugunin v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 2014 WL 1052502, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19,
2014) (“[E]ven if the court were to credit this evidence and find that LOL has shown a likelihood of association, it
would not necessarily follow that the association ‘impair[ed] the distinctiveness of the famous mark.’ 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(2)(b); see also 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:116 (“Even if there is proof
of a likely association, that does not mean that there is also a likelihood of dilution by blurring or tarnishment. The
statute explicitly requires proof of the likelihood that th[e] defendant’s use ‘impairs the distinctiveness of the famous
mark.’ ” (footnotes omitted))), aff’d, 815 F.3d 1064 (7th Cir. 2016); Gap, Inc. v. G.A.P. Adventures Inc., 2011 WL
2946384, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 24, 2011) (“I am not able to find that the association between the marks ‘impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark.’ Gap’s proofs establish that consumers are likely to associate G.A.P
Adventures’ marks with Gap’s marks as a result of the similarities between the marks. However, ‘[t]he fact that
123
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95. This problem with Professor Goodstein’s dilution theory stems from the fact that his
definition of dilution is not the legal concept, despite the attempts of some marketers to
equate them.127 The definition of dilution as “association” would mean that the very
existence of Pepsi dilutes Coke (no pun intended) because it makes the characteristics of
Coke less special and means that consumers need more information about the specific
carbonated, caffeinated brown beverage they want to find to distinguish it from Pepsi.
Stocking of house brands next to Coke in grocery stores would also dilute under this theory,
as would any comparative advertising (whether keyword-triggered or not), as does the listing
of any results other than the searched-for website on any webpage, whether organic or
sponsored.128 This theory of dilution is understandably not a concept of dilution that any
court has ever recognized; it is better called competition. Under this marketer’s perspective
of dilution, only monopolies would be free of any threat of dilution by association.
96. The legal definition of blurring (one of two kinds of dilution), in contrast to Professor
Goodstein’s conception of the term, looks for diminished distinctiveness in the absence of
confusion. Delta Dental and Delta Faucets and Delta Airlines are not confusing, but “Delta”
is diluted. Courts have explicitly rejected the idea that changing the “memory of, and
associations with,” Goodstein Report at 38, a trademark constitutes dilution; they have
protected parodies that may change consumers’ attitudes towards the original trademark
owner. Changed thoughts that still identify the trademark owner as the trademark owner are
not evidence of dilution. Only creating the belief that a trademark actually represents more
than one source, and thus interfering with the source-identifying shorthand function of the
trademark, is dilution.129

people “associate” the accused mark with the famous mark does not in itself prove the likelihood of dilution by
blurring.’”) (citations omitted).
127
To the best of my knowledge, no one has studied whether merely appearing on the same page of a list of results
can cause dilution in the legal sense, even assuming it were not specifically excepted in the law. In the literature
outside of this litigation, the associative network theories that support the “search costs” account of dilution assume
that the defendant is using a similar trademark to identify itself, not merely appearing as an alternative the way a
competitor would appear as an alternative on a grocery store shelf when a consumer sought her top-of-mind brand of
cereal. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEXAS L. REV.
507 (2008).
128
See Joel H. Steckel et al., Dilution Through the Looking Glass: A Marketing Look at the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2005, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 616, 625 (2006) (“Suppose that a competitor to VOLVO introduced and
heavily promoted a new model called ‘Super Safe’ and succeeded in displacing Volvo as the perceived safety leader.
. . . [T]he brand and the power of the VOLVO trademark would be damaged, but not because of the use of the same
or similar name or logo. One could possibly say that the trademark has been metaphorically diluted, but there is no
trademark dilution in a legal sense.”); Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92 TRADEMARK
REP. 585, 620 (2002) (“A form of dilution does occur, of course, when PEPSI, for example, brings COKE to mind.
To those to whom COKE means cola (and cola means COKE), the introduction of PEPSI causes a measure of
product category dilution—COKE no longer is the sole cola schema in the consumer’s mind.”).
129
See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2007) (“In the
context of blurring, distinctiveness refers to the ability of the famous mark uniquely to identify a single source and
thus maintain its selling power…. [B]y making the famous mark an object of the parody, a successful parody might
actually enhance the famous mark’s distinctiveness by making it an icon. … See Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 506
(observing that a successful parody “tends to increase public identification” of the famous mark with its source).”).

43

97. Likewise, the legal concept of tarnishment (the other kind of dilution), in contrast to
Professor Goodstein’s marketing conception of the term, involves a use of a too-similar mark
on a disreputable product. It does not cover comparative advertising that offers “price
discounts that consumers could find deceptive,” Goodstein Report at 40, even assuming, in
the complete absence of evidence, that consumers were dissatisfied with Respondent’s
competitors’ prices. The mechanism by which consumers would blame 1-800 Contacts for
dissatisfaction with another competing retailer in the absence of confusion is not explained
by Professor Goodstein or Mr. Hogan. It is for this reason that empirical investigations of
this kind of tarnishment theory have generally found nothing there.130 While unwanted
sexual associations created by the use of a similar mark by a sex-oriented business may be
deemed tarnishing, that is nothing like the concept posited by 1-800 Contacts’ experts.

130

Christo Boshoff, The Lady Doth Protest Too Much: A Neurophysiological Perspective on Brand Tarnishment, 25
J. PROD. & BRAND MGMT. 196 (2016) (finding no empirical basis for tarnishment); Robert Brauneis & Paul J.
Heald, The Myth of Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of Trademark Dilution by Product and Trade Names, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 2533 (2011) (same, for dilution overall); Michael Handler, What Can Harm the Reputation of a
Trademark? A Critical Re-Evaluation of Dilution by Tarnishment, 106 TRADEMARK REP. 639 (2016).
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My Library: Copyright and the Role of Institutions in a Peer-to-Peer World, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 977 (2006).
Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves
It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
Even More Parodic Than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK
REPORTER 979 (2004). With Bruce P. Keller.
Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with
Campaign Finance Reform, Hate Speech and Pornography Regulation, and
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2001).
Note, Rules of Engagement, 107 YALE L.J. 2583 (1998).
Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J.
651 (1997).
Book chapters:
Architecture and Morality: Transformative Works, Transforming Fans, in CREATIVITY
WITHOUT LAW (Kate Darling and Aaron Perzanowski eds., forthcoming 2016).
Intellectual Property as a Public Interest Mechanism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (forthcoming 2016).
The Indian Arts and Crafts Act: The Limits of Trademark Analogies, in INDIGENOUS
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Matthew
Rimmer ed., 2015).
Revised chapter, Copyright Law, Fan Practices, and the Rights of the Author, in
FANDOM: IDENTITIES AND COMMUNITIES IN A MEDIATED WORLD 60 (Jon Grey et al. eds.,
rev. ed. 2015) (NYU Press).
The Romantic Author and the Romance Writer: Resisting Gendered Concepts of
Creativity, in IP AND DIVERSITY (Cambridge University Press, Irene Calboli & Srividhya
Ragavan, eds., 2015).

4

Transformative Works: Young Women’s Voices on Fandom and Fair Use, in EGIRLS,
ECITIZENS: PUTTING TECHNOLOGY THEORY, POLICY AND EDUCATION INTO DIALOGUE
WITH GIRLS’ AND YOUNG WOMEN’S VOICES (University of Ottawa Press, Jane Bailey &
Valerie Steeves eds., 2015). With Betsy Rosenblatt.
Stolen Valor and Stolen Luxury, in THE LUXURY ECONOMY AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS (Oxford University Press, Barton Beebe et al., eds.,
2015).
The Yes Men and The Women Men Don’t See, in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY? WHAT
CAN/SHOULD LAW DO (Cambridge University Press, Austin Sarat ed., 2014).
Make Me Walk, Make Me Talk, Do Whatever You Please: Barbie and Exceptions, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Jane Ginsburg eds., 2014).
Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commercial Speech Doctrine, in
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Graeme
B. Dinwoodie and Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) (Edward Elgar Press).
Copyright Law, Fan Practices, and the Rights of the Author, in FANDOM: IDENTITIES AND
COMMUNITIES IN A MEDIATED WORLD 60 (Jon Grey et al. eds., 2007) (NYU Press).
Creating in the Shadow of the Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE, VOL. 1: COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS 251 (Peter Yu ed., 2007).
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Fair Use’s Unfinished Business, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 399 (2016).
Free to Be You and Me? Copyright and Constraint, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 125
(2015).
How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2346 (2014).
Surveying Recent Scholarship on Fair Use: A Conversation moderated by Peter
Decherney, 52 CINEMA J. 138 (2013) (with Bill Herman and Jessica Silbey).
Book Review (Making and Unmaking Intellectual Property: Creative Production in Legal
and Cultural Perspective), 2 I.P.L. BOOK REV. 1 (2011).
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Professional Activities:
Member, ICANN Working Group, Review of All Rights Protection Mechanisms, 2016present
Recipient of Public Knowledge’s IP3 Award for Intellectual Property, 2015
Member, ABA Intellectual Property Section, Section 2(a) Task Force, 2015-present
Executive Committee Member, AALS Internet & Computer Law Section, 2011-2013
Co-organizer, IP/Gender: Mapping the Connections, 6th Annual Symposium, Female Fan
Cultures and Intellectual Property, Washington College of Law (American
University) 2009
Co-chair, ABA Antitrust Section Consumer Protection Conference, 2009
Executive Committee member, Intellectual Property Section, AALS, 2008-2009
Member, Blue Ribbon Panel on Fair Use in User-Generated Video, 2008
Member, Georgetown University Copyright Committee, 2007
Board member/co-founder, Organization for Transformative Works, 2007-2010; Chair,
Legal Committee, 2007-2012; member, Legal Committee, 2012-present
Chair, Art Law Section, AALS, 2005-2006
Selected Presentations: My recent presentations can be found at
tushnet.blogspot.com/search/label/presentations.
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Exhibit B: Prior testimony
I have not testified or been deposed within the preceding four years. I submitted the attached
declaration on behalf of Plaintiff in Luxe Hospitality Company v. SBE Entertainment Group,
LLC, No. 2:15-cv-07115-JAK (JPRx), (C.D. Cal.).
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I, Rebecca Tushnet, hereby declare as follows:

23

1.

I am a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center. One of

24

my scholarly specialties is trademark registration. If called to testify, I could and

25

would competently testify to the statements made herein.

26
27

2.

Based on my review of the PTO’s records, Reg. 3,548,611, filed

February 9, 2007, was registered December 23, 2008, for LUXE for Class 43: Hotel

28
61295940.1

TUSHNET DECLARATION ISO PLAINTIFF’S
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

Services. The applicant initially received a nonfinal Office Action indicating a

2

potential conflict with another applicant’s applied-for mark. This nonfinal Office

3

Action did not raise an objection based on mere descriptiveness. Ex. A. Luxe

4

successfully petitioned to cancel that earlier applied-for mark and proceeded to

5

register. Luxe’s declaration of incontestability for the ‘611 registration was

6

accepted on January 24, 2015. Ex. B.
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3.

Reg. 4,212,421, for LUXE with a stylized X for Class 43, received an

8

initial Office Action on September 26, 2011, refusing the applied-for mark on

9

grounds of mere descriptiveness under §2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act. “Mere

10

descriptiveness” is a common ground for an initial rejection. The Office Action

11

noted that “applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and

12

arguments in support of registration.” Ex. C. In its response on February 2, 2012,

13

Luxe claimed distinctiveness under §2(f), in part based on its active ownership and

14

use of the ‘611 registration. Ex. D. The examiner did not reject this contention, and

15

subsequently allowed the mark to proceed to publication, and the mark registered

16

on September 25, 2012.

17
18
19

4.

Reg. 4,177,255, for LUXE HOTELS in Class 44, had a filing date of

June 1, 2011, and registered on the Supplemental Register on July 17, 2011.
5.

Reg. 2,425,916, was a now-cancelled registration on the Supplemental

20

Register for LUXE in Class 42 for hotel services. The examiner initially refused to

21

register the applied-for matter on the Principal Register. The May 12, 2000 Office

22

Action making the refusal final was based on descriptiveness, not on genericness.

23

Ex. E, pp. 8-10 (“Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15

24

U.S.C. Section 1052(e)(1), because the subject matter for which registration is

25

sought is merely descriptive of the identified services.”; “The [m]ark ‘LUXE’ is

26

[d]escriptive and not [s]uggestive of the [s]ervices”).

27
28

6.

As a matter of PTO practice, only descriptive matter capable of

trademark significance, and not generic matter which can never function as a
61295940.1
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1

trademark, may be registered on the Supplemental Register. Examiners may not

2

approve terms they conclude are generic for registration on the Supplemental

3

Register.

4
5

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of

6

America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Washington, D.C. on

7

March 2, 2017.
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Exhibit C: Materials Reviewed List
The following lists the documents and information that I have reviewed in
connection with my report.
Discovery Materials
MSFT-00000029
CX0849
CX0816_1-800F_00045485

Expert Reports
Expert Report and Supplemental Materials of Ronald C. Goodstein (February
23, 2017)
Expert Report and Supplemental Materials of Dr. William M. Landes (February
23, 2017)
Expert Report and Supplemental Materials of Howard S. Hogan (February 23,
2017)
Expert Report and Supplemental Materials of Jacob Jacoby, Ph.D. (February 6,
2017)
Expert Report and Supplemental Materials of Kent D. Van Liere, Ph.D.
(February 23, 2017)
Expert Report and Supplemental Materials of Kevin M. Murphy (February 23,
2017)

Case Filings and Exhibits
Binder v. Disability Group, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2011), First
Amended Complaint
FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. Les Parfums, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 328 (E.D.N.Y.
2009), Permanent Injunction and Judgment on Consent
Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds and Insurance Agency, Inc. dba Gandbonds vs.
Action Immigration Bonds and Insurance Services, Inc. d/b/ba Action
Immigration Bonding case no 2:10-cv-01162 Complaint
Happy Feet USA, Inc vs. Serenity "2000" Corp case no 6:09-cv-1832-DAB
Complaint for Trademark Infringement, Injunctive Relief, and Jury Trial
Requested
J-Rich Clinic, Inc. v. Cosmedic Concepts, No. 02-cv-74324 (E.D. Mich. 2006),
Order Dismissing Actions with Prejudice
Lbf Travel, Inc. v. Fareportal, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 9143(LAK)(GWG), 2014 WL
5671853 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2014 Stipulation of Discontinuance with Prejudice

1

Lbf Travel, Inc. v. Fareportal, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 9143(LAK)(GWG), 2014 WL
5671853 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2014), Order to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint
Pine Tree Legal Assitance v. Legalmatch.com Corporation Complaint and Jury
Trial Demand
Probar, LLC. v. Onebody, individually and d/b/a/ Onebody.com and various
John Does, Jane Does, and ABC Companies Case no. 2:14-cv-166-FtM-38CM
Verified Complaint
Select Management Resources, LLC., Anderson Financial Services, LLC.,
LoanMax, LLC. et al. v. D and D Marketing, Inc., and Dmitry Fomichev Case
no. 2:10-cv-10008-DSF-SS Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relieve
Soaring Helmet Corporation v. Nanal, Inc. d/b/a Leatherup.com Case No. 2:09cv-00789-JLR Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint
Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Industrial Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D.
Ariz. 2008)- Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts
Table C-4 U.S District Courts- Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and
Action Taken During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2014
True & Dorin Med. Grp., P.C. v. Leavitt Med. Assocs., P.A., No. 06-cv-00092
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2006), Partial Stipulation of Dismissal
True & Dorin Med. Grp., P.C. v. Leavitt Med. Assocs., P.A., No. 06-cv-00092
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2006), Second Complaint
True & Dorin Med. Grp., P.C. v. Leavitt Med. Assocs., P.A., No. 06-cv-00092
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2006), Stipulation of Dismissal
True & Dorin Med. Grp., P.C. v. Leavitt Med. Assocs., P.A., No. 06-cv-00092
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2006), Stipulation of Dismissal
True & Dorin Med. Grp., P.C. v. Leavitt Med. Assocs., P.A., No. 06-cv-00092
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2006), Complaint
True & Dorin Med. Grp., P.C. v. Leavitt Med. Assocs., P.A., No. 06-cv-00092
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2006), Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice
True & Dorin Med. Grp., P.C. v. Leavitt Med. Assocs., P.A., No. 06-cv-00092
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2006), Second Amended Complaint
Weightwatchers.com, Inc Weight Watchers International, Inc v Diet Patch, Icon
Health & Fitness, Inc, Ecommerice Transactions, LLC et al case no 1:04-cv04053 Complaint

Case Law

1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013)
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005)
24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. 24/7 Tribeca Fitness, LLC., 447 F. Supp. 2d 266,
280–281 (S.D. N.Y. 2006)
2

A & H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 197 (3d
Cir.1999)
Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120871
Allen v. IM Sols., LLC, 94 F. Supp. 3d 1216 (E.D. Okla. 2015)
Allied Interstate LLC v. Kimmel & Silverman P.C., 2013 WL 4245987
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013)
Allied Interstate LLC v. Kimmel & Silverman P.C., 2013 WL 4245987 (SDNY
August 12, 2013)
America Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812 (4th Cir. 2001)
Anhing Corp. v. Thuan Phong Co., 2015 WL 4517846 (C.D. Cal. July 24,
2015)
Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d (6th Cir. 2006)
Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006)
Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp.
167, 171 (M.D.N.C. 1989)
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d (9th Cir. 1999)
Cal. Business and Professions Code § 14247
Cathey Assocs. v. Beougher, 95 F.Supp.2d (N.D.Tex.2000)
Chanel, Inc. v. Charles, 2016 WL 4491871 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 9, 2016)
Chloe Sas v. Sawabeh Information Services Co., No. 11-cv-04147 (Dkt. 728)
(C.D. Cal. July 8, 2014)
CJ Products LLC v. Snuggly Plushez LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 22, 2011)
Componentone, L.L.C. v. Componentart, Inc., 2008 WL 4790661 (W.D. Pa.
Oct. 27, 2008)
Consumerinfo.com, Inc. v. One Techs., LP, No. CV-09-3783-VBF (MANx)
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011)
Cosmetically Sealed Industries, Inc. v. Chesebrough–Pond’s USA Co., 125
F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1997)
CPC Intern. v. Skippy, 214 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2000)
Dazzlesmile, LLC v. Epic Advertising, Inc., 9-cv-1043 (Mar. 22, 2010)
Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994)
Designer Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811 (D. Ariz.
2008)
DISH Network, LLC v. Fun Dish, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 627 (N.D. Ohio. 2015)
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Intern., Inc., 393 F.Supp. (E.D.N.Y.
1975)
Edible Arrangements, LLC v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 2016 WL 4074121 (D.
Conn. July 29, 2016)
Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL
737064 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006)
Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc., Civil No. 06–4112
ADM/JSM, 2009 WL 4263699 (D. Minn. 2009))
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Federal Express Corporation v. JetEx Air Express Inc., 2017 WL 816479, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2017)
FenF, LLC v. Smarthingz, Inc., No. 12-cv-14770, 2014 WL 1304779 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 28, 2014)
Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 700-01 (7th
Cir. 2014)
FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com Inc., 06-cv-02225 (E.D.N.Y Aug.
9, 2013)
Gap, Inc. v. G.A.P. Adventures Inc., 2011 WL 2946384 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 24,
2011)
Garcia v. Coleman, 2008 WL 4166854 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008)
George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532 (2d Cir. 1992)
Global Tel-Link Corp. v. Jail Call Services, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-1557, 2015 WL
1936502 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2015)
Happy Feet USA, Inc. v. Serenity “2000” Corp., No. 09-cv-1832 (Dkt. 22)
(M.D. Fl. Mar. 16, 2010)
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir.1996)
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d (2d Cir. 1996)
Hugunin v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 2014 WL 1052502,(N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2014)
Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1987)
Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distributing, Inc., 2008 WL 1735371
(E.D.Mich.2008)
International Payment Services, LLC v. CardPaymentOptions.com, 2:14-cv02604-CBM-JC (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2015)
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)
J-Rich Clinic, Inc. v. Cosmedic Concepts, No. 02-cv-74324 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. (1938)
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. (2004)
LG Corporation v. Huang, 2017 WL 476539 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017)
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d (4th Cir.
2007)
Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 661 F. Supp. 2d 632 (N.D. Tex. 2009)
Millennium Laboratories, Inc. v. Ameritox, Ltd., 924 F.Supp.2d 594, 601 (D.
Md. 2013)
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. (2003)
Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d (9th Cir. 2015)
Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. C02-2420RSM, 2006
WL 3761367 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 2006)
Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced System Concepts, Inc., 638 F. 3d (9th
Cir. 2011)
PACCAR v. TeleScan Techs. LLC, 319 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003)
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 341 (1928)
Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d (9th Cir. 1998)
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Partners for Health & Home, L.P. v. Yang, No. CV 09-07849 (CBM) (RZx)
(Dkt. 46) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010)
Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2003)
Pharmacia Corp. v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare, L.P., 292 F. Supp.
2d 594, 604 (D.N.J. 2003)
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns, Corp., 354 F.3d (9th Cir. 2004)
(Berzon, J., concurring)
PODS Enterprises., LLC v. U-Haul International, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1263
(M.D. Fla. 2015)
PrevMED, Inc. v. MNM–1997, Inc., 2017 WL 785656, No. H–15–2856 (S.D.
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Quidgeon v. Olsen, No. 10-cv-1168, 2011 WL 1480537 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 19,
2011)
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d (2d Cir. 2009)
Rhino Sports, Inc. v. Sport Court, Inc., No. CV-02-1815-PHX-JAT, 2007 WL
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Scooter Store, Inc. v. SpinLife.com, LLC, 2011 WL 6415516, at *14 (S.D.
Ohio Dec. 21, 2011)
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